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ABSTRACT 
Demand for corporate non-financial “environmental, social, and 
governance” (ESG) information from investors and governments is 
on the rise globally, and leading securities regulators and stock 
exchanges worldwide now encourage or mandate its disclosure by 
large firms.  However, rising demand has been matched by growing 
dissatisfaction with ESG informational gaps in financial reports, on 
the one hand, and the dearth of investment-grade information in 
corporate sustainability reports and other public sources, on the 
other.  These developments raise questions about whether the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and its counterparts in 
other jurisdictions should continue to defer primarily to private 
market-based approaches to ESG disclosure, reform the disclosure 
framework to expressly address non-financial information, or seek 
to combine elements of both public disclosure regulation and 
private ordering in new ways. 
This Article anticipates these policy choices by assessing the 
range of approaches to ESG disclosure that have been adopted in the 
United States and six other influential jurisdictions: South Africa, 
Brazil, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, and 
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mainland China.  Drawing on this comparative analysis, we find 
that a public-private hybrid approach to ESG disclosure is 
ultimately inevitable, and we argue that optimal approaches for 
improving the quality and utility of non-financial information must 
draw on the comparative advantages of both public and private 
forms of disclosure regulation. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
Demand from investors and governments for corporate non-
financial “environmental, social, and governance” (ESG) 
information is on the rise globally.1  In 2018, institutional investors 
representing over US$5 trillion in assets under management joined 
a petition to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) urging 
it to adopt new rules regarding ESG disclosure by public 
companies.2  These trends reflect mainstream investors’ growing 
recognition of the relationship between material ESG factors and 
financial risk and return, making the term “non-financial” 
somewhat of a misnomer.3  Over the past decade, more than 60 
 
 1 The CFA Institute has defined ESG issues as the “environmental, social, and 
governance issues that [i]nvestors are considering in the context of corporate 
behavior.” CFA INST. CTR. FOR FIN. MKT. INTEGRITY, ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND 
GOVERNANCE FACTORS AT LISTED COMPANIES: A MANUAL FOR INVESTORS 22 (2008). 
The terms “ESG disclosure” and “non-financial reporting” (and combinations 
thereof) are therefore used interchangeably in this Article even though “non-
financial” information extends beyond ESG factors to all disclosures beyond the 
financial statements.  On this distinction, see Richard Barker & Robert G. Eccles, 
Should FASB and IASB be Responsible for Setting Standards for Nonfinancial 
Information? 6-8 (Oct. 12, 2018) (unpublished Green Paper), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3272250 [https://perma.cc/NG3J-2YUP]. 
 2 See Petition for Rulemaking on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) 
disclosure from Cynthia A. Williams, Osler Chair in Bus. Law, Osgoode Hall L. Sch. 
& Jill E. Fisch, Saul A. Fox Distinguished Professor of Bus. Law, U. Pa. L. Sch. to 
Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Oct. 1, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2018/petn4-730.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WW7Z-WR42]. 
 3 According to surveys of institutional investors, 70 to 80 percent consider 
ESG information as important or essential to investment analysis.  See, e.g., Matthew 
Nelson, Is Your Non-financial Performance Revealing the True Value of Your Business to 
Investors?, ERNST & YOUNG 6 (Nov. 29, 2017) [hereinafter ERNST & YOUNG 2017], 
https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY_-
_Nonfinancial_performance_may_influence_investors/$FILE/ey-nonfinancial-
performance-may-influence-investors.pdf [https://perma.cc/RCY3-R9NW] 
(indicating that over half of the investors surveyed believe current non-financial 
information provided by companies is inadequate for meaningful comparison); 
Sustainability Goes Mainstream: Insights Into Investor Views, PWC 6–9 (2014), 
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/pwc-investor-resource-
institute/publications/assets/pwc-sustainability-goes-mainstream-investor-
views.pdf [https://perma.cc/T4P7-837R] (determining that over three-quarters of 
surveyed investors consider sustainability issues to mitigate risk); Tomorrow’s 
Investment Rules 2.0, ERNST & YOUNG 13 (2015), 
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governments4 and international  institutions, including the United 
Nations,5 the OECD,6 the G20,7 the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO), 8  the Worldwide Federation of 
 
https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-ccass-institutional-investor-
survey-2015/$FILE/ey-ccass-institutional-investor-survey-2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/753Z-YLVL] (citing analysts and investors who consider ESG 
factors as important to gauging the risk and value of investments); Kiran 
Vasantham & David Shammai, 2019 Institutional Investor Survey, MORROW SONDALI 
15–16 (2019), https://www.morrowsodali.com/news/institutional-investor-
survey-2019, [https://perma.cc/6DCL-A6GK] (finding that 80  percent of 
institutional investors support integrating ESG factors into mandatory reporting). 
 4 See, e.g., Wim Bartels et al., Carrots & Sticks: Global Trends in Sustainability 
Reporting Regulation and Policy, KPMG INT’L ET AL. (2016) (surveying various 
countries and their reporting standards with respect to ESG factors); Enterprise Risk 
Management: Applying Enterprise Risk Management to Environmental Social and 
Governance-related Risks, COMM. OF SPONSORING ORG. OF THE TREADWAY COMM’N. & 
WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 4, note g (Oct. 2018), 
https://www.coso.org/Documents/COSO-WBCSD-ESGERM-Guidance-Full.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YT8X-63LQ] (citing data showing that over 60 governments 
have adopted such measures); U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World 
Investment Report 2019: Special Economic Zones 116–124 (2019) (highlighting capital 
market policies and instruments that promote sustainable development).  
 5  See About the PRI Initiative, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT 
https://www.unpri.org/about-pri/about-pri/ [https://perma.cc/U6B3-TZW5] 
(last visited Sept. 27, 2019) (describing the United Nations’ voluntary framework 
for institutional investors who commit to engaging with corporations on non-
financial performance). 
 6  See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 
Investment Governance and the Integration of Environmental, Social, and Governance 
Factors (2017), https://www.oecd.org/finance/Investment-Governance-
Integration-ESG-Factors.pdf [https://perma.cc/33J3-LC86]. 
 7 See Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures | TCFD—About the Task 
Force, TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES, https://www.fsb-
tcfd.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/EF9L-JUYY] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019) 
(explaining the mandate of the TCFD and its formation by the G20’s Financial 
Stability Board). 
 8 See Press Release, Sustainable Stock Exch. Initiative, IOSCO having active 
dialogue on sustainability, (July 9, 2018), https://www.sseinitiative.org/home-
slider/iosco-having-active-dialogue-on-sustainability/ [https://perma.cc/J7LY-
HQPW]. 
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Exchanges,9 the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB),10 
and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO),11 have 
also considered how to promote non-financial reporting in order to 
facilitate the valuation of corporate environmental and social risks 
and advance global sustainable development. 12   Both objectives 
require that investment-grade ESG information be accessible to 
investors and other financial market participants. 
However, non-financial reporting has historically been largely 
voluntary and driven by various forms of private ordering, 
including corporate engagement with shareholders and other 
stakeholders, reliance on private standard-setters and private 
governance regimes to promote corporate accountability and 
transparency, and self-regulation by companies, such as voluntary 
sustainability reporting and corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
 
 9 See James Langton, WFE Launches Sustainability Working Group | Investment 
Executive, INV. EXEC. (Mar. 25, 2014), 
https://www.investmentexecutive.com/news/industry-news/wfe-launches-
sustainability-working-group/ [https://perma.cc/752Z-C3N3] (indicating that 
stock exchanges from around the world have created a working group to promote 
sustainable investment); Press Release, The World Fed’n of Exch., The World Fed’n. 
of Exch. Publishes Five Sustainability Principles for Member Exch. (Oct. 4, 2018), 
https://www.world-exchanges.org/news/articles/world-federation-exchanges-
publishes-five-sustainability-principles-member-exchanges 
[https://perma.cc/Y7D9-KZWC] (affirming its active role in promoting 
sustainable investment). 
 10 See Hans Hoogervorst, Chair, Int’l. Accounting Standards Bd., IASB Chair’s 
Speech: The times, they are a-changin’, (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.ifrs.org/news-
and-events/2017/09/iasb-chairmans-speech-the-times-the-are-achangin/ 
[https://perma.cc/36YJ-8Y2S] (noting the IASB’s support for ESG disclosure 
harmonization efforts). 
 11 The ISO has established a technical committee to develop standards for “the 
integrating of sustainability considerations and [ESG] practices into institutional 
investment decision making and wider finance management.”  ISO, ISO/TC322 – 
Sustainable Finance, Int’l. Org. for Standardization, 
https://www.iso.org/committee/7203746.html [https://perma.cc/C2P7-T8TA] 
(last visited Sept. 27, 2019). 
 12 See Commission Interim Report on Financing a Sustainable European Economy, 
at 20–22 (July 2017) [hereinafter EU Report on Sustainable Finance], 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/170713-sustainable-finance-
report_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/TB26-JAFA] (discussing trends in disclosure to 
promote sustainable investment in the European Union).  See also U.N. Sustainable 
Development Goals, About the Sustainable Development Goals, 
https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/ 
[https://perma.cc/AWU7-GXM6] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019) (providing an 
overview of the United Nations’ official platform for sustainable development). 
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commitments. 13   While private ordering has led companies to 
provide more ESG information to the public, the proliferation of 
competing private standards and the lack of alignment between 
voluntary sustainability reporting and disclosure produced in 
corporate annual reports and other public filings have reduced the 
usefulness of ESG information for investment analysis.14  In sum, 
rising demand for investment-grade information has been 
accompanied by growing dissatisfaction with the limited and highly 
variable ESG information disclosed in financial reports, on the one 
hand, and the dearth of investment-grade information in corporate 
sustainability reports and other sources outside corporate annual 
reports, on the other.15 
Since non-financial reporting practice depends so heavily on 
private standards and other forms of private ordering, these 
developments are prompting new questions about whether the SEC 
and its counterparts in other jurisdictions should continue to defer 
primarily to private standards, voluntary frameworks and other 
market-based approaches to ESG disclosure, or should update 
current reporting regimes to standardize how non-financial 
information reaches investors.  If reforms are needed, another 
critical question is whether regulatory responses should displace 
private ordering or instead seek to combine elements of both public 
disclosure regulation and private ordering in new ways. 
As this Article shows, answers to these fundamental questions 
are already being explored outside of the United States as regulators 
throughout the world leverage private sector innovation in order to 
address gaps in the quality and reliability of non-financial reporting.  
For example, many governments have incorporated existing private 
ESG disclosure standards into new rules or guidelines by reference 
or have drawn on these standards as a starting point in developing 
 
 13 See Iris H-Y Chiu, Standardization in Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting 
and a Universalist Concept of CSR?—A Path Paved with Good Intentions, 22 FLA. J. INT’L 
L. 361, 362–363 (2010) (contrasting the treatment of financial and non-financial 
reporting); see also Virginia Harper Ho, Nonfinancial Risk Disclosure & the Costs of 
Private Ordering, 55 AM. BUS. L.J. 407 (2018) [hereinafter Harper Ho, Nonfinancial Risk 
Disclosure] (arguing that the current system of voluntary disclosure of non-financial 
information is inadequate for meaningful comparative analysis and requires 
standardization and regulation). 
 14 See infra Section 1.3. 
 15 See infra Section 1.3. 
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their own ESG disclosure rules. 16   Beyond standard-setting, 
regulators have also sought to improve the reliability of non-
financial reporting by encouraging firms to obtain third-party 
assurance of ESG information.17 
This emphasis on private ordering in ESG disclosure is 
grounded in extensive research within and outside of the legal 
literature on the comparative advantages and effectiveness of 
various forms of private governance, public-private partnerships, 
and related phenomena often referred to broadly as “private 
regulation.” 18   In particular, the literature on public-private 
“hybridity” explores how to optimize the interactions between 
government regulators and private governance regimes acting 
under their own respectively defined powers in pluralistic legal 
systems.19 
Notwithstanding the prominent role of private ordering in 
corporate transparency, we have argued in prior work that 
governments have important roles to play in improving the quality 
and quantity of non-financial reporting.20  This Article is the first to 
consider how national financial regulators can draw on private 
standards, monitoring, and enforcement mechanisms as they 
pursue these important goals. 
 
 16 See infra Section 3. 
 17 See infra Sections 3.2.4 and 3.2.5 (discussing such efforts in the European 
Union and the United Kingdom, respectively). 
 18  See infra Section 2.2.  The term “private ordering” is widely used in 
corporate law to refer to the use of private contracting and negotiation as an 
alternative to statutory mandates; similarly, the term “private regulation” is used 
in the governance literature to refer broadly to alternatives to state regulation. In 
this Article, we endeavor to bring these two literatures together by using the latter 
to capture private standards and other private governance regimes and the former 
as a broader term that also includes private regulation. 
 19 See Gráinne De Búrca & Joanne Scott, Introduction: New Governance, Law and 
Constitutionalism, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 1, 8 (Gráinne 
De Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006).  See also Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a 
Jurisprudence of Hybridity, 1 UTAH L. REV. 11, 12 (2010) (proposing hybridity as a 
means to govern the interactions of state and non-state lawmaking by multiple 
communities). 
 20  See generally Harper Ho, Nonfinancial Risk Disclosure, supra note 13 
(advocating for an SEC framework); Stephen Kim Park, Targeted Social Transparency 
as Global Corporate Strategy, 35 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 87 (2014) [hereinafter Park, 
Targeted Social Transparency] (analyzing the rise of mandatory disclosure under 
securities law of specific human rights impacts). 
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To inform these policy choices, this Article assesses the range of 
approaches to ESG disclosure that have been adopted in the United 
States and six other influential capital markets:  South Africa, Brazil, 
the European Union, the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, and 
mainland China.21  Each of these jurisdictions has implemented ESG 
disclosure through a different balance of public regulation and 
private ordering.  As a group, these countries include many of the 
largest capital markets, globally or regionally.  They also represent 
variation in terms of market size, level of economic development, 
geography, and legal system.22 
Drawing on this comparative analysis, we find that a public-
private hybrid approach to ESG disclosure is ultimately inevitable, 
and we argue that optimal approaches for improving the quality 
and utility of non-financial information must draw on the respective 
advantages of public and private forms of regulation.  Toward this 
end, this Article identifies how non-financial reporting reforms in 
the U.S. context can leverage, harmonize, and legitimize private 
ordering. 
Section 1 of this Article identifies the forces that are driving 
greater investor demand for ESG information and describes 
regulatory efforts to improve the comparability, reliability, and 
quality of ESG information available to the capital markets.  Section 
2 explores a central tension in non-financial reporting reform 
between the standard investor-oriented rationales for mandatory 
disclosure—namely, to promote investor protection, market 
efficiency, and stability—and the stakeholder-oriented goals of 
voluntary ESG disclosure and private regulation.23  Section 2 then 
presents a typology of how public regulation and private ordering 
interact that is particularly relevant to ESG disclosure.  Section 3 
 
 21 Because of Hong Kong’s special status under the concept of “one country 
two systems,” its financial and legal regimes are distinct from those in mainland 
China.  In this Article, we separately address rules that apply to companies 
incorporated or listed in Hong Kong and those incorporated or listed in mainland 
China.  See infra Sections 3.2.6 and 3.2.7. 
 22  For a comparison of these features across the selected jurisdictions, see 
Appendix I infra. 
 23 As is standard in the literature, we use the term “mandatory” to refer to 
reporting requirements imposed by regulators even though in most mandatory 
reporting regimes, such as those that apply under U.S. federal securities law, not all 
reporting rules are prescriptive and companies exercise some discretion in 
determining whether disclosure of particular information is required. 
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applies this typology to the comparative case studies.  This analysis 
shows how regulators are drawing on and yielding to private 
disclosure regimes in reforming the reporting rules that apply to 
companies’ annual reports and other public filings.  Section 4 draws 
on observations from the case studies to identify ways in which 
governments can optimize the roles of public regulation and private 
ordering in ESG disclosure. 
1. UNDERSTANDING ESG DISCLOSURE GAPS 
More than 85 percent of the S&P 500 in the United States and 
more than 90 percent of the largest firms globally now produce 
sustainability reports that disclose ESG information in some form; 
some companies also voluntarily include sustainability or other 
non-financial concepts in their annual reports or proxy statements.24  
However, higher rates of voluntary reporting have not resolved, and 
indeed may exacerbate, ESG information gaps. 25   In response, 
private standard setters, auditors, and investors and firms 
themselves, as well as international organizations and regulators 
worldwide, are working to understand how best to enhance the 
accessibility, reliability, and comparability of material non-financial 
 
 24  Flash Report: 86% of S&P 500 Index® Companies Publish Sustainability / 
Responsibility Reports in 2018, GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY INST., INC. (May 16, 
2019), https://www.ga-institute.com/press-releases/article/flash-report-86-of-
sp-500-indexR-companies-publish-sustainability-responsibility-reports-in-20.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZV6Q-JN5R]; IRRC INST. & SUSTAINABLE INVS. INST. (SI2), STATE 
OF INTEGRATED AND SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING 2018 3 (2018) [hereinafter IRRC], 
https://siinstitute.org/special_report.cgi?id=77 [https://perma.cc/TM7N-
HVZR]. 
 25 See, e.g., IRRC, supra note 24, at 26–33 (discussing the varying materiality 
standards, audiences, and levels of assurance that apply to voluntary reporting); 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-398, RETIREMENT PLAN INVESTING: 
CLEARER INFORMATION ON CONSIDERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND 
GOVERNANCE FACTORS WOULD BE HELPFUL 18–19 (2018) [hereinafter GAO] 
(reporting asset managers and retirement plan representatives’ concerns that there 
is insufficient information regarding ESG factor impacts on investment 
performance); TCFD, FINAL REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON 
CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES 33 (2017) [hereinafter TCFD FINAL 
REPORT], https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/FINAL-
TCFD-Report-062817.pdf [https://perma.cc/CWP4-DTS5] (noting non-uniform 
locations of climate-related disclosures in required financial reporting documents). 
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information to investors.26  This effort is particularly challenging 
because non-financial information that may not be material to 
investors is also important to other corporate stakeholders. 
In the following discussion, we explain the factors behind rising 
demand for ESG information, and how ESG information reaches the 
capital markets.  We also consider the evidence behind the claims 
that ESG information asymmetries exist and that they undermine 
market efficiency.27  These observations provide important context 
for the analysis in Section 2 of the relationship between private 
ordering and traditional public disclosure regulation and, in turn, 
establish the foundation for this Article’s core argument that 
disclosure regulation both can and should draw on private ordering. 
1.1. Factors Driving Demand for ESG Information 
Companies around the world are now facing growing demand 
for ESG information from shareholders, 28  creditors, 29  insurers, 30 
 
 26 See PRI, GLOBAL GUIDE TO RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT REGULATION 3 (2016), 
https://www.unpri.org/download?ac=325 [https://perma.cc/634T-QU2G] 
(surveying responsible investment policies in the top fifty national economies by 
GDP and finding that all but Iran have policy initiatives on ESG factors and 
investment).  See also supra note 4 and sources cited therein (surveying global 
policies on ESG disclosure). 
 27  See infra notes 34–43 and accompanying text.  This claim is a central 
conclusion of the TCFD’s global review of climate-related disclosure, and an 
underpinning of all recent work on the integration of non-financial information into 
financial reporting.  See, e.g., TCFD, PHASE I REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-
RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES 13 (2016) [hereinafter TCFD PHASE I], 
https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/03/Phase_I_Report_v15.pdf [https://perma.cc/X74L-
Z9V9].  Testing this claim empirically is beyond the scope of this paper.  For a 
review of the literature, see Virginia Harper Ho, Risk-Related Activism: The Business 
Case for Monitoring Nonfinancial Risk, 41 J. CORP. L. 647 (2016) (presenting evidence 
of the economic relevance to investors of non-financial information on risk). 
 28 See supra note 3 and sources cited therein. 
 29 See generally Stephen Kim Park, Investors as Regulators: Green Bonds and the 
Governance Challenges of the Sustainable Finance Revolution, 54 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2018) 
[hereinafter Park, Investors as Regulators] (discussing the global market for bonds 
earmarked to finance “green” projects). 
 30  See Climate Risk Disclosure, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS (NAIC), 
https://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_climate_risk_disclosure.htm 
[https://perma.cc/ZJ76-4FVG] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019). 
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rating agencies,31 and financial regulators.32  In the past, demand for 
non-financial information focused solely on how corporate 
operations impacted workers, the environment, or human rights, 
and pressure for greater transparency came primarily from non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), consumers, and other public 
stakeholders who urged companies to become more socially 
responsible.  In some markets, including the United States, they 
were joined by investors who sought non-financial information 
primarily to address ethical or public policy issues associated with 
their investments. 33   Companies paid far less attention to the 
business and financial risks associated with these issues or to 
whether non-financial information might be material to mainstream 
investors.  
Times have changed.  According to the London Stock Exchange, 
ESG-related information “has moved from a ‘peripheral’ to a ‘core’ 
part of investment analysis, across all asset classes.” 34   Most 
institutional investors now expect companies to make materiality 
determinations about the financial impact of their environmental 
and social (i.e., employment-related) practices, in addition to 
increasing transparency around more traditional non-financial 
factors such as corporate governance.35  Although the materiality of 
particular ESG factors to investors varies according to industry 
 
 31  See, e.g., Environmental, Social and Governance, FITCH RATINGS, 
https://www.fitchratings.com/site/esg [https://perma.cc/P9RZ-R9DL] (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2019) (explaining a new system developed to show how ESG factors 
may impact individual credit ratings). 
 32 See generally IOSCO, STATEMENT ON DISCLOSURE OF ESG MATTERS BY ISSUERS 
(2019), https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD619.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MD2J-FTEX] (describing the key role that regulators play in 
encouraging issuers to disclose material ESG factors to investors); TCFD FINAL 
REPORT, supra note 25 (referencing climate-related disclosure requirements and 
giving recommendations for areas where these requirements could be improved to 
reduce risk). 
 33 See DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 22, 130 (2005); Lloyd Kurtz, Socially Responsible 
Investment and Shareholder Activism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 249, 250–61 (Andrew Crane et al. eds., 2008) (discussing the 
different forms and rationales of responsible investment). 
 34 LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE GROUP, YOUR GUIDE TO ESG REPORTING 3 (2018), 
https://www.lseg.com/sites/default/files/content/images/Green_Finance/ESG
/2018/February/LSEG_ESG_report_January_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9T8-
6H5D]. 
 35 See supra note 3 and sources cited therein. 
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sector and requires a firm-specific analysis, 36  the financial 
materiality of a wide range of ESG information is supported by 
empirical research across asset classes and, over time, has 
demonstrated the impact of many ESG factors on firm and portfolio-
level risk and return, both individually and in the aggregate.37  Like 
the governments and other international institutions referenced 
earlier,38 IOSCO, the primary governance body of national securities 
and financial regulators, has affirmed this view, stating “ESG 
matters, though sometimes characterized as non-financial, may 
have a material short-term and long-term impact on the business 
operations of the issuers as well as on risks and returns for investors 
and their investment and voting decisions.”39 
Mainstream investors are also beginning to view ESG 
information as material to voting decisions and as a focus of direct 
engagement with companies.40  One key reason is that investors also 
see effective management of environmental and social risk as part of 
sound corporate governance and as a driver of long-term 
profitability. 41   In global capital markets, institutional investors, 
which are signatories to the United Nations Principles for 
 
 36 On the sector-specific nature of ESG materiality, see GAO, supra note 25, at 
5–6 (raising the fact that there is large-scale sectoral variation regarding climate 
risk); TCFD PHASE I, supra note 27 (observing similar variation).  See also Robert G. 
Eccles et al., The Need for Sector-Specific Materiality and Sustainability Reporting 
Standards, 24 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 65 (2012) (advocating sectoral disclosure 
standards). 
 37 See, e.g., Gunnar Friede, Timo Busch & Alexander Bassen, ESG and Financial 
Performance: Aggregated Evidence from More Than 2000 Empirical Studies, 5 J. SUSTAIN. 
FIN. 210–33 (2015) (analyzing studies and meta-studies since the 1970s); GORDON L. 
CLARK ET AL., FROM THE STOCKHOLDER TO THE STAKEHOLDER: HOW SUSTAINABILITY 
CAN DRIVE FINANCIAL OUTPERFORMANCE (2015), 
https://arabesque.com/research/From_the_stockholder_to_the_stakeholder_we
b.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6WF-FPV7] (surveying academic studies).  See also GAO, 
supra note 25, at 8, 23–24 (discussing results of a U.S. Department of Labor review 
of the literature in 2017 that reached similar conclusions). 
 38 See supra notes 5–12 and sources cited therein. 
 39 IOSCO, supra note 32, at 1. 
 40  See generally GAO, supra note 25 (identifying how asset managers 
incorporate ESG factors into investment management); Principles and Policies, 
VANGUARD, https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/principles-
policies/ [https://perma.cc/TM8K-8QY8] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019) (describing 
how voting, advocacy, and investment policies integrate ESG factors). 
 41 See GAO, supra note 25, at 23–24 (finding that asset managers who use ESG 
information do so primarily to achieve “enhanced risk management” and 
“improved long-term performance”). 
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Responsible Investment (PRI), commit to integrate ESG information 
into their investment analysis and to use their influence to promote 
better corporate ESG performance and transparency; these investors 
now represent over US$80 trillion in total assets under 
management.42  Their impact is particularly visible in the United 
States, where such investors hold one-fifth of all assets under 
management and where ESG issues are a consistent focus of 
shareholder activism.43  As a result of these changes, the perceived 
divide between financial and non-financial performance is 
shrinking. 
Although they are not the primary beneficiaries of corporate 
financial reporting, governments and regulators are also beginning 
to recognize the need for ESG risk disclosure to inform public policy, 
including financial regulation.  Issues where informed policy-
making requires reliable non-financial data include questions 
regarding the role of corporations and financial institutions in 
promoting sustainable development goals,44 government responses 
to global threats, such as climate change and cybersecurity risk,45 
and the development of “sustainable finance” policies that can help 
capital markets direct capital to more environmentally sustainable 
uses.46  Governments are also considering ESG disclosure reform in 
 
 42 IRRC, supra note 24, at 12.  At its inception in 2006, this figure was US$6.3 
trillion.  Id. 
 43 GAO, supra note 25, at 9.  See infra Section 3.2.1 (discussing investors’ role 
in pushing for broader ESG disclosure in the United States). 
 44  See, e.g., SDG Compass, https://sdgcompass.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/EH7P-XCGD] (aiding companies in promoting the Sustainable 
Development Goals). 
 45 See, e.g., EU REPORT ON SUSTAINABLE FINANCE, supra note 12 (considering 
sustainable finance policies and regulation); TCFD FINAL REPORT, supra note 25, at 
iii (recommending disclosure to aid better climate-related public policy). 
 46 See generally TCFD FINAL REPORT, supra note 25.  See also Guiding Opinions 
on Establishing the Green Financial System (关于构建金融体系的指导意见 ) 
(promulgated by the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), China Ministry of Fin. (MOF), 
Nat’l Dev. & Reform Comm’n (NDRC), China Ministry of Envtl. Prot. (MEP), China 
Banking Reg. Comm’n (CBRC), China Sec. Reg. Comm’n (CSRC), and China Ins. 
Reg. Comm’n (CIRC), Aug. 31, 2016, effective Aug. 31, 2016) (articulating policy 
goals and an action plan for “greening” China’s financial system). 
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response to rising public demand for greater corporate 
accountability and transparency.47 
1.2. Sources of ESG Information 
To be sure, the sheer volume of non-financial information 
reaching the capital markets has grown exponentially over the past 
few decades as sustainability and CSR concepts have gained broad 
acceptance in the market and among corporate boards.  Most 
obviously, public regulatory agencies, such as environmental or 
labor protection agencies, may impose reporting obligations,48 but 
this information is not intended for investors or reported with 
reference to financial materiality, making it difficult to incorporate 
in financial analysis.49   Instead, ESG disclosure has largely been 
driven by private ordering, as private standard-setters and other 
market actors have created a vast array of reporting obligations, 
frameworks, and standards that capture non-financial information 
in various forms. 
Despite the expansion of private disclosure frameworks and the 
relatively limited extent of non-financial information disclosed in 
corporations’ public filings, 50  investors prefer to obtain ESG 
information from companies’ annual reports, proxy statements, and 
other mandatory filings because of their perceived reliability.51  For 
the same reason, mandatory filings are the primary data source for 
ESG databases, such as Bloomberg’s ESG suite and others widely 
used by financial analysts. 
 
 47 See, e.g.  Report of the Committee on Legal Affairs on corporate social responsibility: 
accountable, transparent and responsible business behavior and sustainable growth 
(2012/2098(INI)), A7-0017/2013, Jan. 28 2013) [hereinafter EU Parliament CSR 
Report] (noting public demand in Europe for greater corporate accountability); see 
also IRRC, supra note 24, at 10–11 (discussing changing public expectations as 
driving demand for better corporate disclosures). 
 48 Bartels et al., supra note 4, at 14 (aggregating these measures). 
 49 TCFD PHASE I, supra note 27, at 8, 13; TCFD FINAL REPORT, supra note 25, at 
1–2. 
 50 On the limitations of non-financial information contained in public filings, 
see generally infra Section 1.3. 
 51  ERNST & YOUNG 2017, supra note 3, at 18. 
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In over 60 jurisdictions, ESG disclosure in some form is required 
or encouraged as a matter of financial regulation, corporate law, or 
stock exchange listing rules.52  According to a 2018 report from the 
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) Institute, 40 percent 
of S&P 500 companies mention sustainability information in their 
annual reports or proxy statements (excluding disclosures of risk 
factors or environmental matters).53  Globally, nearly 80 percent of 
the 250 world’s largest companies reportedly include some kind of 
ESG information in their annual reports, a trend linked to the rise in 
regulatory measures on ESG disclosure. 54   At present, however, 
most publicly available ESG information is produced outside 
companies’ public filings and is intended for a broad range of 
stakeholders.  These sources include information provided on 
corporate websites or in corporate sustainability reports whose 
content and format is determined by each company and that are 
based on guidelines set more often by private standard setters than 
by securities regulation.  These private standards and other forms of 
private regulation have proliferated over the past two decades, 
laying the groundwork for many of the reporting regimes now being 
developed by governments and international organizations. 
Generally, these reporting frameworks are created by private or 
quasi-private NGOs, at times with support from international 
organizations or governments, and typically with sustained input 
from corporations and other stakeholders.  The most prominent of 
these is the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)’s framework, which 
covers a comprehensive range of ESG topics.55   Others focus on 
environmental and climate-related indicators 56  or apply only to 
 
 52  More than 70 governments have now adopted sustainability reporting 
measures; 80 percent are mandatory.  Reporting Exchange, 
https://www.reportingexchange.com [https://perma.cc/56FH-FTLT] 
(subscription based) (last visited Sept. 27, 2019). 
 53 IRRC, supra note 24, at 32–33. 
 54  See KPMG, THE ROAD AHEAD: THE KPMG SURVEY OF CORPORATE 
RESPONSIBILITY REPORTING 2017, at 21 (2017), 
https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2017/10/kpmg-survey-of-
corporate-responsibility-reporting-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/RY83-2BKP]. 
 55  See Global Reporting Initiative, GRI Standards, 
https://www.globalreporting.org/standards [https://perma.cc/H9UQ-BWX8] 
(last visited Sept. 27, 2019). 
 56  See, e.g., CDP, About Us, https://www.cdp.net/en/info/about-us 
[https://perma.cc/N6KP-HZFL] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019). 
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certain sectors.57  Many firms also draw on CSR standards, such as 
the ISO 26000 CSR guidelines, 58  the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises (OECD Guidelines), 59  or the United 
Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
(Guiding Principles),60 which have been developed by international 
organizations.  Increasingly, these standards include a mix of 
qualitative and quantitative ESG performance indicators that 
companies may elect to use.  However, only a few, such as the 
Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) sector-specific 
indicators,61 the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC)’s 
integrated reporting framework, 62  and the Climate Disclosure 
Project (CDP)’s environmental reporting standards,63 are designed 
to help companies integrate ESG information into their annual 
reports based on existing materiality standards. 
In addition to these sources, more than 100 sustainability rating 
companies regularly distribute ESG questionnaires to companies 
worldwide in order to generate proprietary, comparable ESG data.64  
These vary widely in terms of the ultimate end-user (investor or 
 
 57  See, e.g., EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (EITI), 
https://eiti.org/ [https://perma.cc/RR5S-VP9B] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019). 
 58  ISO 26000 SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, https://www.iso.org/iso-26000-social-
responsibility.html [https://perma.cc/XQ9A-QYU2] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019). 
 59  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 
https://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/1922428.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7R9-
4ZUE] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019). 
 60  United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights, 
https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_
eN.pdf [https://perma.cc/B67B-AY3C] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019). 
 61  The Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) has developed 
sector-specific indicators based on the legal definition of materiality that applies 
under federal securities law.  SASB, Standard-Setting Process, 
https://www.sasb.org/approach/our-process/ [https://perma.cc/5NG5-3DTS] 
(last visited Sept. 27, 2019). 
 62  INTEGRATED REPORTING, https://integratedreporting.org 
[https://perma.cc/5NG5-3DTS] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019). 
 63  Who We Are, CDP, https://www.cdp.net/en/info/about-us 
[https://perma.cc/N6KP-HZFL] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019). 
 64  See generally Generic Surplus About Us, GISR, 
https://ratesustainability.org/about/why-gisr/ [https://perma.cc/Z8YQ-2TT4] 
(introducing its effort to coordinate, harmonize, and render transparent ESG 
ratings) (last visited Sept. 27, 2019). 
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consumer), scope and content (particular indicators and ESG issues 
covered), and in the underlying methodologies that produce the 
ratings. 65   In addition, companies receive questionnaires and 
shareholder proposals from their shareholders seeking specific ESG 
information.66  This type of uncoordinated approach to disclosure is 
costly for both companies and investors and is unconnected to 
disclosures in public filings.67 
1.3. The State of ESG Disclosure 
Despite the amount of ESG information produced by companies, 
evidence from investor surveys and extensive research by the TCFD, 
OECD, and the United Nations indicate that although ESG 
disclosure may have important impacts on corporate behavior, 
current ESG disclosure practices do not generate the level or quality 
of ESG information needed for investment analysis and efficient risk 
pricing and capital allocation.68  These information asymmetries are 
due to the voluntary nature of most ESG disclosure and, perhaps 
ironically, to the very wealth of private disclosure initiatives.  The 
expansion of ESG-oriented investment tools, services, and voluntary 
frameworks has not only increased the volume of publicly available 
ESG information, but has made the job of identifying which 
information is material from a financial standpoint more difficult.  
To the extent ESG-related information asymmetries persist, they can 
be expected to reduce market efficiency and perhaps mislead 
 
 65 Id. 
 66  Sustainability Goes Mainstream: Insights Into Investor Views 7 (2014), 
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/pwc-investor-resource-
institute/publications/assets/pwc-sustainability-goes-mainstream-investor-
views.pdf [https://perma.cc/T4P7-837R] (finding that 89 percent of investors 
surveyed were “very likely” to seek ESG information through questionnaires). 
 67 For a more complete discussion on this point, see Harper Ho, Non-Financial 
Risk Disclosure, supra note 13, at 453–55. 
 68  See TCFD FINAL REPORT, supra note 25; at i–ii (concluding that the 
inadequacies of current disclosure standards and the lack of information on the 
financial impacts of climate change may impair the accurate pricing of securities).  
See also supra note 3, and sources cited therein (reporting institutional investor 
views). 
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investors as to the true nature of their investment risk.69  Ineffective 
disclosure also shines a weak light on areas of real risk to corporate 
stakeholders that companies should be incentivized to address. 
The first challenge is that ESG information contained in annual 
reports and other mandatory filings is quite limited and varies 
widely, making meaningful comparison difficult.70  In the United 
States, fear of litigation leads many companies to limit disclosure of 
forward-looking information and to provide generic risk disclosures 
in their annual reports.71  There is also evidence that the structure of 
the current federal disclosure system and the courts’ approach to 
securities fraud cases have contributed to the under-reporting of 
even known material risks.72 
As noted earlier, many international organizations have begun 
to actively promote ESG disclosure and are supporting efforts to 
standardize how companies report on their non-financial 
performance.73  Among the most prominent efforts are the voluntary 
 
 69  There is already emerging empirical evidence of ESG information 
asymmetries.  See Harrison Hong et al., Climate Risks and Market Efficiency, 208 J. 
ECONOMETRICS 265 (2019) (analyzing cross-sectional data on climate risk from thirty 
countries). 
 70  See SUSTAINABILITY ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD. (SASB), THE STATE OF 
DISCLOSURE REPORT (2016), https://www.sasb.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/08/StateofDisclosure-Report-113016v2-
1.pdf?__hstc=105637852.3b9784be80b3bcb8619b39bd91cce44e.1571883159156.1571
883159156.1571883159156.1&__hssc=105637852.2.1571883159156 
[https://perma.cc/HS7P-GU65] (analyzing over 700 filings, including 597 10-K 
filers and 116 20-F filers, across 434 disclosure topics). 
 71 See id. at 2 (reporting that the most common form of sustainability disclosure 
to the SEC—across the majority of industries and topics—was generic boilerplate 
language); Letter from Davis Polk & Wardwell, to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, SEC at 10 
(July 22, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-313.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7NCE-R9AL] (stating that companies “generally limit their 
voluntary forward-looking disclosure to … investor presentations that are 
‘furnished’ with the Commission under Form 8-K rather than in ‘filed’ periodic or 
current reports in response to the heightened litigation risk associated with 
documents that may be included or incorporated into a registration statement or 
prospectus and therefore subject to Section 11 and Section 12 of the Securities Act.”). 
 72 See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Disasters and Disclosures: Securities Fraud 
Liability in the Shadow of a Corporate Catastrophe, 107 GEO. L.J. 967 (2019). 
 73 See supra notes 5–11 and sources cited therein.  The IASB, FASB, and many 
of the private standard setters and international organizations who have focused 
on ESG disclosure have formed a Corporate Reporting Dialogue which aims to 
harmonize and standardize existing frameworks.  See CORPORATE REPORTING 
DIALOGUE, https://corporatereportingdialogue.com/ [https://perma.cc/YX3J-
TCKU] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019). 
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guidelines developed by the G20’s Task Force on Climate-Related 
Disclosure (TCFD), which were released in 2017. 74   The TCFD 
Recommendations are expressly intended to promote disclosure of 
ESG information on the basis of the same materiality standards that 
apply to financial reporting, to apply to financial institutions as well 
as companies outside the financial sector, and to encourage the 
integration of material ESG information into companies’ annual 
reports.75 
ESG information provided in sustainability reports also lacks 
consistency in both format and content, and so lacks the 
comparability required for investment and voting purposes.  Private 
third-party frameworks for sustainability reporting often encourage 
companies to identify their own key stakeholders, and to define 
materiality in terms of corporate impacts on stakeholders, rather 
than in terms of financial impact or relevance to investors.76  The 
IRRC’s 2018 study found that most companies do not follow a single 
voluntary reporting framework, but instead adopt their own “style, 
format, and content,” making comparisons across companies 
extremely difficult.77  Although many leading reporting frameworks 
encourage companies to clearly indicate how they have defined 
materiality in their sustainability reports, many companies do not 
do so. 78   As a result, the information disclosed in voluntary 
sustainability reports is not readily comparable over time for the 
same firm, or across firms, sectors, and reporting frameworks.79  
Voluntary sustainability reporting is also far from universal, as it is 
less common among smaller public companies.80 
 
 74  See generally TCFD FINAL REPORT, supra note 25 (recommending a 
framework for climate-related financial disclosures to allow stakeholders to make 
informed decisions economic and climate-related decisions). 
 75 Id. 
 76 See IRRC, supra note 24, at 26–27 (discussing this problem); TCFD FINAL 
REPORT, supra note 25, at iii, 5–11, tbls. 1 & 2 (explaining alternative definitions of 
materiality in the sustainability context). 
 77 See IRRC, supra note 24, at 5, 31–32 (finding that 97 percent of reporting 
companies chose to customize instead of following one reporting framework, and 
that 25 percent of reporting companies did not disclose use of a specific framework). 
 78 Id. 
 79  Harper Ho, Nonfinancial Risk Disclosure, supra note 13, at 428–30; Park, 
Targeted Social Transparency, supra note 20, at 93. 
 80 ERNST & YOUNG 2017, supra note 3, at 18. 
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Disclosure made under private frameworks is even more 
difficult for investors to integrate with periodic reporting, and it is 
more costly for investors to obtain, since there is no central reporting 
repository akin to the SEC’s EDGAR platform.  The information is 
also less reliable, since companies are not required to obtain 
independent third-party auditing or assurance, although most 
frameworks and some governments encourage it.81 
The plethora of competing private standards and reporting 
frameworks also reduces the comparability and consistency of 
disclosure, creating confusion and increased costs for investors, as 
well as higher liability risk for companies.82  Ongoing efforts to align 
financial and non-financial reporting are being confronted by the 
different needs of investors and stakeholders. 83   All of these 
limitations are driving regulatory responses to non-financial 
reporting, different components of which are examined in Parts II 
and III. 
2. PRIVATE STANDARDS AND PUBLIC DISCLOSURE 
With the growth of non-financial reporting and the problems 
posed by the proliferation of different voluntary frameworks and 
practices, governments considering non-financial reporting reforms 
must address already existing private ESG disclosure regimes and 
other forms of private ordering.  The following discussion begins by 
describing mandatory disclosure regimes, typically adopted by 
securities and financial regulators and stock exchanges, and 
 
 81 See, e.g., GLOB. REPORTING INITIATIVE AND GLOB. SUSTAINABILITY STANDARDS 
BOARD, GRI 102: GENERAL DISCLOSURES, DISCLOSURE 102–56, 41 (2016), 
https://www.globalreporting.org/standards/gri-standards-download-
center/?g=51c631dd-b541-4a63-ad4b-5f7d38502d78 [https://perma.cc/XMQ5-
8DJG] (recommending standards for the use and disclosure of external assurance 
of reports). 
 82  See IRRC, supra note 24, at 16–24 (surveying the “sea of sustainability 
reporting models”); Harper Ho, Nonfinancial Risk Disclosure, supra note 13, at 452–
56 (identifying how relying on voluntary reporting raises costs to companies and to 
investors). 
 83 See Better Alignment Project, CORPORATE REPORTING DIALOGUE (Nov. 7, 2018), 
https://corporatereportingdialogue.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/11/Corporate-Reporting-Dialogue-Better-Alignment-
Project.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6EJ-Z8SN]. 
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comparing them with voluntary reporting based on private 
standards.  Incorporating theoretical and empirical research in law, 
business ethics, management studies, public policy, and political 
science, we identify a range of modes of interaction between public 
regulation and private standards as a foundation for considering the 
comparative examples of ESG disclosure reform presented in 
Section 3. 
2.1. Disclosure Rationales 
Since most of the world’s largest companies already produce 
some form of voluntary non-financial reporting, the initial question 
for many governments is whether to continue to allow market-based 
practices to evolve without regulatory intervention.  Answering this 
question requires revisiting many of the traditional rationales for 
mandatory disclosure and asking whether voluntary non-financial 
reporting and private ordering meet those goals.  If governments are 
already considering how to address the non-financial information 
gaps described above, they must also understand that voluntary 
non-financial reporting and the disclosure contained in corporate 
annual reports or proxy statements are based on different 
materiality standards since they are produced for different 
audiences.  The following discussion outlines these key differences 
as a preface to the typology of public-private interaction that follows 
in Section 2.2. 
2.1.1. Investor-Oriented Rationales and Goals of Public Mandatory 
Disclosure 
According to IOSCO, the core purpose of mandatory disclosure 
under the securities laws or stock exchange listing rules is to protect 
investors from fraud, to promote “fair, efficient and transparent 
markets,” and to reduce systemic risk, all of which require that 
financial market participants have timely access to reliable 
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information.84  In the United States, the SEC has also stated its core 
mission in these terms.85  By increasing confidence in the integrity of 
the capital markets, mandatory disclosure also supports market 
liquidity, stability, and ultimately capital formation. 86   In 
jurisdictions where shareholders have a central role in corporate 
governance, disclosure may facilitate more effective corporate 
governance and reduce agency costs.87 
For investors, mandatory disclosure provides these benefits 
more efficiently and fairly than relying on investor self-help, since 
companies can more readily obtain and report the same information 
publicly to all investors than investors and analysts can on their 
own.88  In the absence of mandatory disclosure, corporate managers 
also have incentives to under-report, particularly with respect to 
risks or negative information.89  Mandatory disclosure also offers 
benefits to reporting companies.  Specifically, they face the same 
disclosure demands as their competitors, and they are less 
vulnerable to unpredictable and potentially costly investor demands 
for information.90 
 
 84  See INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS (IOSCO), 
OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION 3 (2017), 
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD561.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U75H-AG4U]. 
 85 See, e.g., Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, 17 
CFR Parts 210, 229, 230, 232, 239, 240 & 249 [Release No. 33-10064; 34–77599; File 
No. S7-06-16], 81 Fed. Reg. 23,916, 23,919 (concept release Apr. 22, 2016) [hereinafter 
Regulation S-K Concept Release] (“[l]owering information asymmetries between 
managers of companies and investors may enhance capital formation and the 
allocative efficiency of the capital markets…[D]isclosure…may lead to more 
accurate share prices, discourage fraud, heighten monitoring of the managers of 
companies, and increase liquidity.”). 
 86 See id. (noting the role of mandatory disclosure in capital formation). 
 87 See Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under 
the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 336–38 (1979) (highlighting how 
reducing agency costs protects investors); Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, 
The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 718–19 (2006) (arguing 
that “narrowing disclosure duties would in fact hamper the ability of information 
traders to minimize total management agency costs.”). 
 88  See Park, Targeted Social Transparency, supra note 20, at 94 (noting that 
without mandatory disclosure, market participants often cannot obtain information 
on social concerns). 
 89 See Langevoort, supra note 72, at 975–85 (discussing the incentives for and 
prevalence of misleading under-disclosure regarding risk). 
 90  See Harper Ho, Nonfinancial Risk Disclosure, supra note 13, at 454–55 
(discussing the costs to companies of private ordering). 
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Nonetheless, all jurisdictions acknowledge that the goal is not to 
achieve full disclosure—however that may be defined—but rather 
an optimal level of disclosure that balances the costs to issuers of 
obtaining, reporting, and auditing information.  Disclosure 
obligations are therefore limited to “material” or “significant” 
information, as those concepts are defined in each jurisdiction.91  
Although reporting rules may prescribe specific disclosures, 
companies are often free—even under mandatory reporting 
statutes—to make their own materiality judgments, and different 
approaches to “mandatory” disclosure may offer companies greater 
discretion regarding specific disclosures. 92   For example, some 
jurisdictions rely heavily on prescriptive, line-item disclosure while 
others rely more on reporting principles or guidance. 
By ensuring that the capital markets have access to reliable 
information about the financial impacts of certain market-wide ESG 
risks, such as climate change, mandatory disclosure may also reduce 
the degree to which global capital markets are exposed to high 
volatility when large-scale risk events materialize.93  Concerns about 
this kind of systemic risk are among the reasons why the G20’s 
Financial Stability Board has encouraged more financial-sector firms 
and other public companies to measure and disclose material 
climate-related risk in their annual reports.94  However, improving 
transparency around these financial risks may require companies to 
report not only on the financial effects of ESG risks that are material 
to them, but also on the external impacts of their operations on their 
stakeholders.  Some of this information may not be material to the 
firm itself but may contribute to financial risk on a systemic basis, 
 
 91 In the United States, for example, information is defined as material for 
purposes of securities regulation if there is “a substantial likelihood that a 
reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote” or 
“that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable 
investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information” available to 
the investor.  See TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (quoted 
and applied by Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988)). 
 92  In the United States, material information not expressly required to be 
reported under the federal securities laws must only be disclosed if it is “necessary 
to make [a] required statement, in light of the circumstances … not misleading.”  17 
C.F.R. § 230.408; 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20. 
 93 TCFD FINAL REPORT, supra note 25, at iii, 1. 
 94 Id.  
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perhaps due to aggregated or networked effects across whole 
segments of the market.95  
2.1.2. Rationales and Goals of Voluntary Disclosure 
While mandatory disclosure focuses primarily on the 
informational needs of investors and the markets as a whole, 
voluntary ESG disclosure frameworks have developed to promote 
somewhat different goals either as a form of private regulation of 
corporate behavior, or as a tool to enforce other private governance 
regimes, namely, corporations’ “voluntary” commitments to 
responsible business conduct.  In both cases, the goal of disclosure 
is to encourage companies to reduce the negative impacts of their 
operations on corporate stakeholders.  As a result, companies define 
materiality in terms of stakeholder concerns under these private 
non-financial reporting frameworks rather than in terms of financial 
risk and return. 
Indeed, the rise of sustainability reporting has been based on 
widespread recognition that disclosure is in fact “information 
disclosure regulation” 96  and governments themselves often use 
disclosure as an alternative to traditional command-and-control 
public regulation.97  Sustainability reporting is intended to motivate 
companies to change practices that cannot hold up under greater 
transparency.  It also facilitates external oversight of corporations 
from consumers, NGOs, and other stakeholders. 98   Although 
disclosure is often less effective than direct regulation,99 this is due 
 
 95  See Tom C.W. Lin, Reasonable Investor(s), 95 B.U. L. REV. 461, 510 (2015) 
(noting that “firm-by-firm disclosures [fail to] fully depict the complexity and 
interconnectedness of many of today’s investment instruments and corporations”). 
 96 Reinhard Steurer, Disentangling Governance: A Synoptic View of Regulation by 
Government, Business and Civil Society, 46 POL’Y SCIENCES 387, 401 (2013). 
 97 See California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010, CAL. CIVIL. CODE 
§1714.43 (2010) (mandating disclosure to encourage companies to monitor 
suppliers’ conduct). 
 98 Sarah E. Light & Eric W. Orts, Parallels in Public and Private Environmental 
Governance, 5 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. LAW 1, 39 (2015); see also Park, Targeted Social 
Transparency, supra note 20, at 95–96 (describing the disclosure feedback loop). 
 99 See generally Steven M. Davidoff & Claire A. Hill, Limits of Disclosure, 36 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 599 (2013) (noting that regulators tend to prefer imposing new 
disclosure rules rather than dealing with the core issues through direct regulation). 
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to the flexibility it provides companies—typically, the form of the 
information and the process by which it is disclosed are mandated, 
but specific conduct is not, leaving firms substantial discretion in 
determining how to respond.100 
In addition to voluntary ESG disclosure frameworks, separate 
corporate non-financial reporting requirements have emerged in 
support of private governance regimes that promote CSR and 
address the governance gaps created by the expansion of business 
activity beyond the jurisdiction of national governments.101  Private 
governance is widely recognized as an alternative to traditional 
government regulation and self-regulation by individual firms.102  It 
typically includes codes of conduct, policies, and practices adopted 
by industry-wide organizations or groups of firms.103   The most 
prevalent forms of private governance are principles-based, 
certification, reporting, and process standards that seek to reduce 
corporations’ environmental, social, or human rights impacts and 
draw heavily on international treaties and business conduct 
norms.104 
In private governance regimes, industry associations, NGOs, 
and other non-state actors are responsible for developing standards 
and enforcing them vis-à-vis their members. 105   Disclosure is a 
 
 100 See Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim Park, Turning Corporate Compliance Into 
Competitive Advantage, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 285, 319–20 (2017) (defining market-
contingent business regulation). 
 101 See Dirk Ulrich Gilbert, Andreas Rasche, & Sandra Waddock, Accountability 
in a Global Economy: The Emergence of International Accountability Standards, 21 BUS. 
ETHICS Q. 23, 24, 28–29 (2011) (addressing “[m]echanisms that attempt to fill the 
omnipresent governance voids that the rise of the global economy has created”). 
 102 See VOGEL, supra note 33, at 9 (“Civil regulation represents an effort to fill 
the governance gap between the law and the market.”). 
 103 Steurer, supra note 96, at 395–96. 
 104 See generally Gilbert, Rasche, & Waddock, supra note 101, at 25–30.  See also 
Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 
148–56 (2013).  See also Oren Perez, Private Environmental Governance as Ensemble 
Regulation: A Critical Exploration of Sustainability Indexes and the New Ensemble 
Politics, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 543, 550 (2011) (describing different types of 
industry-based environmental private governance standards).  For example, ISO 
14001 environmental management systems are based on a private governance 
standard that establishes a set of procedures and organizational practices to assist 
a firm in achieving its environmental goals.  
 105  See Matthew Potoski & Aseem Prakash, Green Clubs and Voluntary 
Governance: ISO 14001 and Firms’ Regulatory Compliance, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 235, 235 
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critical enforcement tool that enables other companies and external 
stakeholders to identify shirkers and ensures that participating firms 
satisfy the standards they have voluntarily adopted as a member or 
signatory of the regime.106  For example, companies that sign on to 
the United Nations Global Compact must produce an annual 
“communication on progress” to explain their efforts to comply with 
the Global Compact’s ten principles of responsible business 
practice.107   In general, firms voluntarily adhere to these private 
standards due to a combination of civil society pressure from NGOs, 
market pressure, strategic self-interest, and social norms. 108  
Compliance is also enhanced by other private actors through 
external third-party assessment,109 or by the threat of expulsion from 
the private governance regime for non-compliance.110  All of these 
private governance mechanisms also depend on information about 
corporations’ business practice, which has fueled the rise of 
voluntary ESG disclosure and private disclosure frameworks. 
The fact that sustainability reporting and non-financial reporting 
standards have evolved as a soft form of private regulation is not 
widely appreciated by opponents of ESG disclosure reforms.  
Although critics of regulatory solutions often prefer shareholder 
engagement, voluntary sustainability reporting, and private 
reporting standards as market-driven approaches to ESG 
 
(2005) (examining the creation of private standards by “governance clubs” of 
industry associations).  Civil society organizations also promulgate these private 
standards.  See also Steurer, supra note 96, at 395–96 (referencing standards 
developed by Amnesty International and Ceres). 
 106 See Potoski & Prakash, supra note 105, 26–29 (identifying disclosure as one 
of three “swords” voluntary regulatory regimes adopt to preserve the regime’s 
stringency and reputation). 
 107  See UN GLOBAL COMPACT, THE COMMUNICATION ON PROGRESS IN BRIEF, 
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/participation/report/cop 
[https://perma.cc/BJ4D-NQST]. 
 108 David Vogel, Private Global Business Regulation, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 261, 
268–69 (2008). 
 109 See generally Margaret M. Blair, Cynthia A. Williams & Li-Wen Lin, The New 
Role for Assurance Services in Global Commerce, 33 J. CORP. L. 325, 337–46 (2008) 
(describing the growing importance of such assessments). 
 110 See Lesley K. McAllister, Harnessing Private Regulation, 3 MICH. J. ENVTL. & 
ADMIN. L. 291, 314 (2014) [hereinafter McAllister, Harnessing] (noting the revocation 
power of voluntary labeling and certification regimes). 
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disclosure,111 private non-financial reporting regimes were in fact 
designed to advance regulatory goals that extend far beyond those 
of most governments’ frameworks for financial reporting. 
2.2. Modes of Interaction Between Public Regulation and Private 
Ordering in ESG Disclosure 
As the case studies in Section 3 illustrate, many governments are 
introducing new measures to improve how companies disclose 
material ESG information to investors.  At the same time, public 
debate about the appropriate scope, mode, and purpose of ESG 
disclosure reflects continued concern about corporate accountability 
given the growing disjuncture between the scale of business activity 
and the ability of governments to regulate it.112  The proliferation of 
private ESG disclosure frameworks reflects ongoing efforts by non-
state actors to fill both of these gaps.113 
Some governments look to ESG disclosure to advance both 
investor and market-oriented disclosure reform, and greater 
corporate accountability.  For these regulators, the dichotomy 
between public disclosure regulation and private non-financial 
reporting frameworks, while useful for analytical purposes, belies 
reality.  The regulatory literature confirms that private regimes, like 
the emerging private disclosure standards, work best when backed 
 
111  See Shearman & Sterling LLP, Concept Release on Business and Financial 
Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K (Aug. 31, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-367.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/44TH-YGYW]. 
 112 See Andreas Georg Scherer, Guido Palazzo & Dorotheé Baumann, Global 
Rules and Private Actors: Toward A New Role of The Transnational Corporation in Global 
Governance, 16 BUS. ETHICS Q. 505, 512 (2006) (“[E]conomic actors undermine the 
internal sovereignty of nation states, namely the state’s ability to independently set 
rules and limit or regulate domestic private activities within its jurisdiction”).  See 
also Stephen Kim Park & Gerlinde Berger-Walliser, A Firm-Driven Approach to Global 
Governance and Sustainability, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 255, 259–66 (2015) (noting the 
structural shortcomings of state-based environmental regulation to address climate 
change). 
 113  See Gilbert, Rasche, & Waddock, supra note 101, at 24 (referring to 
“Mechanisms that attempt to fill the omnipresent governance voids that the rise of 
the global economy has created . . . because of an increasing imbalance in global 
rulemaking”). 
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by intelligent regulation, 114  and that many governments have 
adopted non-coercive regulatory approaches that are functionally 
similar to private governance regimes like those that govern 
voluntary ESG disclosure.115  
Even for governments that focus primarily or exclusively on the 
core investor protection, market efficiency, and stability goals of 
securities regulation, public regulators can engage with existing 
private governance regimes in numerous ways,116 and when they do 
so, retain varying levels of authority and control.117  Accordingly, in 
order to identify the legal and policy options available to the SEC and 
other regulators, it is essential to analyze the ways in which public 
regulation of corporate reporting may interact with private ordering.  
To that end, we present a typology that distinguishes five types of 
interactive and iterative relationships between public and private 
regulation and other forms of private ordering: deference, support, 
partnership, delegation, mandating, and displacement. 
The following figure defines these modes and provides an 
example of each mode in an applicable reporting context. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 114 See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
543, 551 (2000) [hereinafter Freeman, Private Role] (declaring that “There is no such 
thing as a purely private or purely public realm”).  See also VOGEL, supra note 33, at 
170 (arguing that “The effectiveness of much civil regulation depends on a strong 
and well-functioning public sphere”). 
115  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., NUMEROUS FEDERAL ACTIVITIES 
COMPLEMENT U.S. BUSINESS’S GLOBAL CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY EFFORTS 
(Aug. 2005), https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05744.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TL3F-TLZQ] (describing CSR initiatives of the U.S. 
government). 
 116 See McAllister, Harnessing, supra note 110, at 317 (describing harnessing as 
“how public legislators and regulators can intentionally construct regulatory 
frameworks that rely upon and incorporate private regulation.”) 
 117  See Tim Bartley, Transnational Governance as the Layering of Rules: 
Intersections of Public and Private Standards, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRY L. 517, 523 (2011) 
(“Rather than viewing private regulation as either transcendent or technical, a more 
promising route involves paying attention to its substantive interactions with 
domestic law, regulation, and other rules.”). 
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Figure 1. Modes of Public-Private Interaction 
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It is important to note, at the outset, that these modes constitute 
stylized ideal types.  For example, nearly all mandatory disclosure 
regimes for public companies require disclosure of corporate 
governance matters and material risks, and these rules can elicit 
some form of non-financial reporting.  Likewise, private ordering is 
ubiquitous and cannot be fully displaced by regulation, even if 
doing so would be desirable.  Conceptualizing public-private 
interaction as ideal types enables an analysis of the discretionary 
power and overlap that exists in practice. 
Governments may also simultaneously engage through multiple 
modes with respect to a given issue, such as non-financial reporting.  
For example, a regulator may simultaneously (i) endorse or facilitate 
ESG disclosure standards, 118  (ii) mandate when reporting is 
 
 118  See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International 
Regulation Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration 
Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 521–23, 544–45 (2009) (defining directive and 
facilitative forms of state orchestration). 
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required with respect to specific ESG information, (iii) partner with 
a private standard-setting organization to develop ESG disclosure 
rules, and (iv) delegate responsibility for assurance of ESG 
disclosure to private third-party providers.  Within each mode of 
interaction are also many potential regulatory strategies. 
These modes of interaction are distinguishable in part by their 
regulatory strength.  Public regulators employ different degrees of 
governmental power in their interactions with private standard-
setting organizations and the firms that adopt them.  The extent to 
which regulators expend government resources on command-and-
control rulemaking, garnering political support, providing financial 
incentives, and convening interested parties reflects the willingness 
and ability of regulators to use their unique powers to influence how 
well private disclosure regimes work.119 
Consistent with Jody Freeman’s conception of governance, we 
posit that the interaction between public regulators and private 
disclosure regimes is the result of negotiated relationships that are 
dynamic, nonhierarchical, and decentralized.120   The relationship 
between public-private interaction and regulatory strength is also 
inherently bilateral and dynamic. 121   This is because regulatory 
reform can stimulate changes in private standard setting, and 
voluntary ESG disclosure standards can also iteratively inform later 
regulatory reforms. 
The following figure shows the spectrum of regulatory strength 
reflected by each mode of interaction. 
 
 119  See JETTE STEEN KNUDSEN & JEREMY MOON, VISIBLE HANDS: GOVERNMENT 
REGULATION AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS RESPONSIBILITY 47–49 (2017).  See also IAN 
AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE 
DEREGULATION DEBATE 101–32 (1992) (presenting a model of enforced self-
regulation). 
 120 See Freeman, Private Role, supra note 114, at 571–74. 
 121 See Fabrizio Cafaggi, New Foundations of Transnational Private Regulation, 38 
J. L. & SOC’Y 20, 45 (2011) (noting that the relationship between public regulation 
and private standards may depend on the identity of private participants, the 
instruments adopted, and the objectives of the relevant regulatory regimes). 
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Figure 2. Spectrum of Regulatory Strength 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2.1. Deference 
At the end of the spectrum representing the weakest use of state 
power, governments may passively or actively defer to private 
ordering.  Some governments may do so passively, simply by not 
acknowledging or engaging with non-financial reporting issues or 
with private reporting standards.  However, public regulators may 
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For example, financial regulators may choose to forego engaging with 
ESG private reporting regimes based on a view that the needs and 
actors served by financial reporting or public regulation are distinct 
from those served by private standards.122  This position is evident in 
the United States where private ESG disclosure is the predominant 
 
 122 See Ronald J. Gilson, Henry Hansmann, & Mariana Pargendler, Regulatory 
Dualism as a Development Strategy: Corporate Reform in Brazil, the United States, and 
the European Union, 63 STAN. L. REV. 475, 480 (2011) (defining regulatory 
diversification). 
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source of non-financial information in the United States, due to the 
SEC’s general deference to private ordering.123 
In contrast, the following four modes of interaction—support, 
partnership, delegation, and mandating—exhibit various forms of 
engagement between public regulation and private governance with 
respect to non-financial reporting.  Employing regulatory strategies 
under these modes enables governments to align or engage with 
voluntary reporting frameworks and other private governance 
regimes. 
2.2.2. Support 
Moving further along the regulatory strength spectrum, 
governments interested in promoting non-financial reporting may 
also employ measures short of regulation to support non-financial 
reporting instead of directly mandating it, steering existing private 
governance regimes in a desired direction or encouraging the 
development of regulatory frameworks based on public-private 
collaboration. 124   Because government regulators are involved, 
however, their interactions with private governance regimes and 
firms are in the “shadow of hierarchy” that is defined by legal rules 
and legal institutions and so the state retains the power to exercise its 
authority.125 
2.2.2.1. Endorsement 
One way government can support corporate non-financial 
reporting practices is by endorsing private ESG disclosure 
 
 123 See infra Section 3.2.1. 
 124  See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of 
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 344 (2004) 
(characterizing New Governance as “a more participatory and collaborative model, 
in which government, industry, and society share responsibility for achieving 
policy goals.”); Abbott & Snidal, supra note 118, at 507–09 (contrasting New 
Governance-based regulation with traditional governmental regulation). 
 125  See Steurer, supra note 96, at 399 (describing, in general terms, public 
regulation “in the shadow of hierarchy”). 
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standards.126  Endorsement effectively legitimizes specific private 
reporting regimes that meet pre-specified requirements.127  Public 
regulators may also disseminate information about certain reporting 
regimes, or use labels and logos to signal their support for specific 
private standards, giving them the explicit backing of the state.128  
Endorsement may also be institutionalized in regulatory guidance, 
such as through the selection and publication of industry best 
practices129 or the selection of a private ESG disclosure standard as 
a template or model.130   As discussed below, governments most 
strongly endorse private standards by delegating their regulatory 
standard-setting authority to private reporting regimes.131 
The SEC has endorsed third-party standards in the past.  For 
example, in the context of its specialized disclosure requirements for 
conflict minerals under Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC 
requires an issuer to use a “nationally or internationally recognized 
due diligence framework” in exercising due diligence on the source 
and chain of custody of its conflict minerals, 132  and in its 2012 
rulemaking, the SEC expressly recognized the OECD’s due 
diligence guidance as the sole framework to meet this criterion.133 
 
 126  See Tom Fox et al., Public Sector Roles in Strengthening Corporate Social 
Responsibility: A Baseline Study 6 (World Bank, Working Paper, Oct. 1, 2002), 
https://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/284431468340215496/pdf/346550
CSR1CSR1interior.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4AN-8Q8E]. 
 127  See Lars H. Gulbrandsen, Dynamic Governance Interactions: Evolutionary 
Effects of State Responses to Non-State Certification Programs, 8 REG. & GOVERNANCE 
74, 76 (2014) (noting how governments can also limit the authority of a private 
governance regime by supporting the creation of competing standards). 
 128 KNUDSEN & MOON, supra note 119, at 64–65. 
 129 See David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294, 302 (2006) (arguing 
that the cultivation of best practices by public regulators constitutes a form of 
administrative rulemaking). 
 130  See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and 
Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1302 (1999) (proposing that 
the SEC adopt Ceres’ reporting format for mandatory social disclosure under the 
Exchange Act). 
 131 See infra notes 142–147 and accompanying text. 
 132 Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,324 (Sept. 12, 2012). 
 133  See id. at 56, 281 (“Presently, it appears that the only nationally or 
internationally recognized due diligence framework available is the due diligence 
guidance approved by the [OECD].”).  See also OECD Due Diligence Guidance for 
Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas (3d 
ed. 2016), https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/OECD-Due-Diligence-Guidance-
Minerals-Edition3.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2EC-ZND5]. 
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 2.2.2.2. Facilitation 
Public regulators can also directly facilitate the adoption and use 
of private ESG disclosure standards by market participants.134  Most 
notably, governments can assist private reporting regimes by 
providing them financial or administrative support.135  This may be 
undertaken by bringing to bear the state’s unique resources, such as 
providing tax relief or exemptions for companies that use private 
reporting regimes.136  Regulators can also enhance the capacity of 
private governance regimes through benchmarks and guidelines.137 
2.2.3. Partnership 
Beyond supporting voluntary ESG disclosure, public regulators 
may choose to partner with private actors, for example, to jointly 
develop rules or incorporate private standards into law or 
regulations.138  Public regulators may initiate or convene this kind of 
collaboration, or may engage with private governance regimes as a 
co-equal participant.139  Particularly at the global level, governments 
routinely participate in ad hoc networks and non-hierarchical 
governance arrangements with companies, NGOs, and other state 
and non-state actors.140  These practices may even be institutionalized 
as a form of deliberative, experimental learning.141  For example, as 
the case studies in Section 3 illustrate, many governments are 
working to harmonize their reporting standards with the GRI 
 
 134 See Fox et al., supra note 126, at 5. 
 135 See Gulbrandsen, supra note 127, at 77 (conceptualizing the contributions of 
governments to private certification programs). 
 136 KNUDSEN & MOON, supra note 119, at 65–66. 
 137 Fox et al., supra note 126, at 4–5. 
 138  See Martijn W. Scheltema, Assessing Effectiveness of International Private 
Regulation in the CSR Arena, 13 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 263, 272–73 (2014). 
 139 See KNUDSEN & MOON, supra note 119, at 67. 
 140  Grainne de Búrca, Robert O. Keohane & Charles Sabel, New Modes of 
Pluralist Global Governance, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 723, 733–38 (2013). 
 141 See Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Learning from Difference: The New 
Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU, 14 EUR. L.J. 271, 305–09 (2008). 
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Standards, which the vast majority of the largest firms are already 
familiar with. 
2.2.4. Delegation 
In addition, public regulators may choose to delegate regulatory 
functions, such as standard-setting, oversight, or enforcement, to 
private disclosure regimes.  Governments can formally permit 
private standards to regulate a given area autonomously, or allow 
them to do so subject to review and oversight either directly by a 
regulator or indirectly through a private self-regulatory 
organization (SRO).142  Public regulation may serve as a default or 
fallback option if a private governance regime fails to meet a legally-
established minimum threshold.143  
With respect to financial reporting, for example, the SEC 
delegates regulatory authority over accounting rules to the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB), a private organization which 
is responsible for establishing Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP).  Similarly, other governments have delegated 
authority to a private international body, the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB), to harmonize global 
accounting standards through the production and dissemination of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).144 
Encouraging or requiring the use of third-party auditors and 
assurance providers is also a delegation of regulatory monitoring 
authority to private third-party actors. 145   For example, in 
 
 142  See Roberta S. Karmel & Claire R. Kelly, The Hardening of Soft Law in 
Securities Regulation, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 884, 884 (2009) (referring to the SEC’s 
adoption of SRO-established standards).  The criteria or conditions on such 
delegation are a form of meta-regulation, which represents a regulatory mandate, 
see infra notes 154–156 and accompanying text. 
 143  See David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, New Governance and Legal 
Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 539, 549 
(2007) (referring to default hybridity). 
 144  See TIM BÜTHE & WALTER MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS: THE 
PRIVATIZATION OF REGULATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 60–98 (2011) (describing the 
emergence of the IASB). 
 145 The use of private auditors and assurance providers may also constitute a 
form of partnership—rather than delegation—depending on the operational 
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implementing the requirements of Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act on management evaluation of internal financial controls, the 
SEC required companies to base this evaluation on a third-party 
framework that met certain criteria.146  Similarly, both U.S. and EU 
conflict mineral disclosure rules require that reporting companies 
use independent third-party auditors—again a form of delegation.147  
Finally, granting private rights of action to shareholders or other 
third parties to enforce disclosure requirements or anti-fraud rules 
is another common form of delegation. 
2.2.5. Mandating 
Toward the stronger end of the regulatory strength spectrum, 
public regulators can of course adopt new mandatory disclosure 
standards within existing regulatory reporting frameworks.148  Yet 
even within traditional rulemaking or legislation, public regulators 
may use their authority to incorporate private standards into public 
law; in such cases, mandating also endorses or facilitates private 
governance.149  Public regulators may expressly reference existing 
private ESG disclosure standards in their rulemaking or support the 
development of private standards that are later incorporated by 
reference.150  For example, the SEC referenced the internal control 
framework created by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations 
 
autonomy of the private third parties and the nature of their relationships with 
governments.  See Lesley K. McAllister, Regulation by Third Party Verification, 53 B.C. 
L. REV. 1, 12 (2012) [hereinafter McAllister, Third Party Verification] (characterizing 
third-party verification as public-private partnership). 
 146  Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Final Rule, Management’s Report on Internal 
Control Over Financial Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act 
Periodic Reports, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,636, 36,639–41 (June 18, 2003) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pt. 210, 228, 229, 240, 249, 270 & 274). 
 147  See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A)(i) (2010) (requiring companies to hire an 
independent, private auditor to confirm the chain of custody of certain minerals); 
Parliament and Council Regulation  2017/821, art. 12 2017 O.J. (L 130) 1, 3 (EU) 
(“Third-party auditing of an economic operator’s supply chain due diligence 
practices ensures credibility for the benefit of downstream economic operators…”). 
 148 Fox et al., supra note 126, at 3. 
 149 McAllister, Harnessing, supra note 110, at 319. 
 150 Nina A. Mendelson, Private Control over Access to Public Law: The Perplexing 
Federal Regulatory Use of Private Standards, 112 MICH. L. REV. 737, 750 (2014). 
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of the Treadway Commission (COSO) in its rules implementing 
Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and also expressly 
harmonized the SEC’s rules with COSO’s framework.151  Another 
example of incorporation by reference in ESG disclosure are conflict 
minerals regulations in the U.S. and the EU, which comprehensively 
embed the OECD’s due diligence guidance in their rules. 152   In 
addition, a government regulator may effectively incorporate a 
private ESG disclosure standard by granting it mutual recognition 
vis-à-vis corresponding public regulatory requirements.153 
Another form of mandating is the use of “meta-regulation,” that 
is, when governments regulate the private regulators rather than 
setting the standards themselves, in order to enforce minimum 
standards.154  For example, a public regulator may require that a 
private reporting regime meet certain requirements before it can be 
used by market participants.155  When adopting meta-regulation, 
like traditional regulation, the regulator exercises a higher level of 
regulatory strength than in the prior modes of interaction, but meta-
regulation nonetheless provides autonomy and flexibility to private 
governance regimes.  In contrast to traditional command-and-
 
 151 See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Final Rule, Management’s Report on Internal 
Control Over Financial Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act 
Periodic Reports, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,636, 36,639–41 (June 18, 2003) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pt. 210, 228, 229, 240, 249, 270 & 274); COSO, INTERNAL CONTROL-INTEGRATED 
FRAMEWORK (1992). 
 152 See Parliament and Council Regulation  2017/821, art. 12 2017 O.J. (L 130) 
1, 3 (EU) (setting up a European Union system for supply chain due diligence self-
certification of responsible importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and 
gold originating in conflict-affected and high-risk areas); European Commission, 
The EU’s new Conflict Minerals Regulation: A quick guide if you’re involved in the trade 
in tin, tungsten, tantalum or gold 5 (Mar. 2017) (identifying the articles of the EU 
conflict minerals regulation that correspond to each of the five steps of the OECD’s 
due diligence guidance). 
 153 See Kalypso Nicolaidis & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Mutual Recognition 
Regimes: Governance without Global Government, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 279 
(2005).  Mutual recognition permits regulators to recognize another jurisdiction’s 
standards as an adequate substitute.  Stephen Kim Park, Guarding the Guardians: The 
Case for Regulating State-Owned Financial Entities in Global Finance, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 
739, 785 (2014).  Traditionally, mutual recognition has been applied to other state-
based regulators.  See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Mutual Recognition in International 
Finance, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 56 (2011). 
 154 See generally CHRISTINE PARKER, THE OPEN CORPORATION: EFFECTIVE SELF-
REGULATION AND DEMOCRACY 245–91 (2002). 
 155 See De Búrca & Scott, supra note 19, at 7 (referencing baseline hybridity). 
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control regulation, mandating minimum criteria for private 
reporting standards enables a private standard-setting organization 
to choose whether to comply with the minimum standard.  Meta-
regulation can also deliberately incorporate flexible and open-ended 
criteria. 156   For example, this may entail requiring private ESG 
regimes to articulate the objectives and scope of their reporting 
frameworks to their users, instead of mandating that they include 
certain reporting criteria. 
2.2.6. Displacement 
At the far end of the regulatory strength spectrum, governments 
may theoretically refuse to collaborate with private governance 
regimes or may reject them altogether.157  If this is the case, when a 
private standard becomes a viable alternative to public regulation, 
the government could seek to displace it158 or may choose to directly 
compete with privately developed rules and standards.159 
In the context of non-financial reporting, the SEC and other 
public regulators could compete with private disclosure regimes, for 
example, by establishing mandatory reporting rules under national 
securities laws or stock exchange listing rules that do not align with, 
but would supersede, existing private standards for most of the 
largest firms.160  Although we are not aware of such a case, public 
regulation could also theoretically preempt private governance, for 
example, by requiring companies to report all material ESG 
 
 156 See KNUDSEN & MOON, supra note 119, at 68. 
 157 Tim Bartley, Transnational Governance as the Layering of Rules: Intersections of 
Public and Private Standards, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRY L. 517, 524–25 (2011). 
 158  See Burkard Eberlein et al., Transnational Business Governance Interactions: 
Conceptualization and Framework for Analysis, 8 REG. & GOVERNANCE 1, 11–12 (2014) 
(describing various types of interaction between the standards developed by the 
government and by private actors including competition and cooptation). 
 159 See Scheltema, supra note 138, at 273 (observing that competition may occur 
between standards set by private actors and those set by the government). 
 160 See Margaret Ryznar & Karen E. Woody, A Framework on Mandating Versus 
Incentivizing Corporate Social Responsibility, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 1667, 1673–74 (2015) 
(discussing disclosure requirements mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-
Frank Acts). 
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information only in the annual report and not in a free-standing 
sustainability report.161 
3. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT APPROACHES TO 
ESG DISCLOSURE 
Governments seeking to respond to growing demand for non-
financial information must consider the modes of public-private 
interaction outlined in Section 2 because any reforms will be 
adopted against a backdrop of existing private standards and 
enforcement mechanisms.  The inevitable result is a transition from 
deference to existing ESG disclosure regimes and other forms of 
private ordering, to a hybrid model where public regulation and 
private governance intersect.  To understand what this might look 
like in practice, we examine the experience of countries that have 
followed this path across different capital markets. 
This comparative analysis applies the theories of public-private 
interaction discussed in Section 2 to different jurisdictional contexts 
in order to identify regulatory approaches to non-financial 
reporting.  The following discussion begins by describing this 
Article’s comparative methodology and then proceeds by applying 
it to the United States and six other leading jurisdictions.  For the 
SEC and other regulators considering whether to undertake non-
financial reporting reform in the future, our analysis offers a rich 
source of insight into the specific forms hybrid public-private non-
financial reporting systems can take and how to optimize private 
ordering within existing public disclosure regimes. 
3.1. Methodology 
We start from the premise that the optimal modes of public-
private interaction will likely differ across jurisdictions. 162   As 
 
 161 See Freeman, Private Role, supra note 114, at 575 (noting reasons why certain 
functions should remain exclusively under state authority). 
 162 See Dan Wielsch, Global Law’s Toolbox: Private Regulation by Standards, 60 
AM. J. COMP. L. 1075, 1077 (2012) (“[P]rivate normative orders face diverging 
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Section 2 shows, the interaction of public regulation and private 
governance is a dynamic process, in part driven by the policy 
objectives, administrative capacity, and legal constraints of the 
public regulator.163  Further, government strategies are shaped by 
competitive market pressures, such as support for (or opposition to) 
government intervention by market participants.164  Although we 
cannot examine in this Article all of the critical factors that have 
influenced these policy choices and may affect their success, we 
identify how each jurisdiction approaches ESG disclosure from the 
standpoint of investors. 
The scope of our comparative analysis is the United States, along 
with South Africa, Brazil, the European Union, the United Kingdom, 
Hong Kong, and mainland China.  Because the United States has yet 
to adopt non-financial reporting requirements for reporting 
companies, it represents a jurisdiction where public regulation most 
closely reflects deference to private ordering.  We therefore begin 
our comparative analysis by introducing the U.S. approach to ESG 
disclosure.  The remaining jurisdictions reflect two criteria.  First, 
they constitute the largest capital markets in the world or in their 
respective regions (e.g., South Africa, Brazil, the European Union, 
the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, and mainland China) outside the 
United States.  As Appendix I shows, they also reflect a diversity of 
legal systems.  In addition, certain countries—such as South Africa, 
Brazil, and the United Kingdom—have been early movers in ESG 
disclosure.  Accordingly, these case studies provide insights on how 
public regulation of non-financial reporting by market leaders has 
taken account of private ordering. 
 
conditions for recognition in different states. As a consequence, the success of states 
in the law market depends on how responsive a particular state law is to instances 
of private regulation.”). 
 163 Gulbrandsen, supra note 127, at 86. 
 164 See CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 133–34 
(2012).  See also Nikolay A. Dentchev, Elvira Haezendonck & Mitchell van Balen, 
The Role of Governments in the Business and Society Debate, 56 BUS. & SOC’Y 527, 530 
(2017) (arguing that “researchers need to . . . focus on the specific mechanisms 
related to the role of governments . . . within the institutional country setting”). 
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3.2. Case Studies 
The case studies below are presented in order of the degree of 
regulatory strength the jurisdiction’s approach to ESG disclosure 
reflects—that is, from the most deferential or market-based to the 
most state-dominated.  In each, we identify the modes of public-
private interaction from Section 2 that shape the jurisdiction’s 
approach to non-financial reporting.  Specifically, we analyze how 
ESG disclosure is addressed under each jurisdiction’s laws and how 
public regulation in each jurisdiction interacts with private ESG 
disclosure frameworks.  These discussions incorporate aspects of the 
institutional context and political economy that may affect modes of 
public-private interaction, which we summarize in Appendix I.  To 
identify the regulatory strength of private disclosure regimes, we 
identify whether ESG disclosure regulation is mandatory, 
voluntary, or applies on a comply-or-explain basis. 165   These 
elements are summarized in Appendix II.  We also identify other 
ESG disclosure policies or incentives that regulators have 
introduced and what modes of interaction they represent.  
3.2.1. United States 
Among the jurisdictions included here, the United States best 
represents a model where public regulation (i.e., U.S. federal 
disclosure rules) largely defers to private ordering or private 
regulation with respect to standard-setting, assurance, and 
enforcement of ESG disclosure.  The current U.S. approach to non-
financial reporting is a bifurcated disclosure system:  private 
ordering in the form of third-party reporting standards, voluntary 
disclosure, and shareholder activism drives stakeholder-oriented 
sustainability reporting, while corporate annual reports and proxy 
 
 165 Comply-or-explain corporate governance or sustainability measures allow 
companies to comply by either attesting that they have adopted the stated practice 
or by explaining why they have not.  See FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL (FRC), WHAT 
CONSTITUTES AN EXPLANATION UNDER ‘COMPLY OR EXPLAIN’? REPORT OF DISCUSSIONS 
BETWEEN COMPANIES AND INVESTORS 5 (Feb. 2012), 
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/a39aa822-ae3c-4ddf-b869-
db8f2ffe1b61/what-constitutes-an-explanation-under-comply-or-exlpain.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P3A7-BSG5]. 
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statements remain subject to the reporting rules established under 
federal securities laws.  State corporate governance rules give 
directors and officers significant discretion to consider stakeholder 
interests, 166  but given the strong influence of the shareholder 
primacy norm among business and legal professionals and the 
preference of many U.S. companies and their advisors for private 
ordering over regulatory intervention, non-financial reporting 
reform faces resistance, and views on the materiality of ESG factors 
to investors are still evolving.167  Past efforts to use disclosure as a 
regulatory tool have also faced strong opposition and legal 
challenge. 168   Given these limits, U.S. non-financial reporting 
practice continues to defer heavily to private ordering and private 
regulation, with limited facilitation and endorsement of voluntary 
reporting and private ESG disclosure initiatives. 
To be sure, the general rules that govern corporate reporting in 
the United States already require disclosure of material non-
financial information. 169   While the scope of such disclosure is 
subject to companies’ own assessments of ESG materiality, some 
companies provide sustainability—or climate-risk—disclosure in 
their annual reports. 170   In addition, the SEC has adopted 
“specialized disclosures” regulations that cover the use of conflict 
 
 166 See generally Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 
80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (2005) (observing the wide legal bounds for profit-sacrificing 
decisionmaking); LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH 29–31 (2012) 
(discussing how business judgment rule deference permits deviation from 
shareholder primacy). 
 167  Comments from companies and business groups on the SEC’s 2016 
Regulation S-K Concept Release reflect mixed views on ESG materiality but strong 
opposition to disclosure reforms.  See generally Virginia Harper Ho, Disclosure 
Overload? Lessons for Risk Disclosure & ESG Reporting Reform From the Regulation S-K 
Concept Release, 65 VILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (empirically analyzing public 
comments to the SEC on ESG materiality and other aspects of risk disclosure). 
 168  See Harper Ho, Nonfinancial Risk Disclosure, supra note 13, at 471–73 
(discussing examples). 
 169  See Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate 
Change, 75 Fed. Reg. 6,290 (Feb. 8, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 211, 231, & 241) 
[hereinafter SEC Climate Release], https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2010/33-
9106.pdf [https://perma.cc/KKW3-G6RA] (explaining how current disclosure 
rules extend to material information on climate-related risks). 
 170  See supra note 53 and accompanying text; see also SASB, supra note 70 
(reviewing the quality of these disclosures). 
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minerals in supply chains,171 certain business activities in Iran,172 
and, for firms in the extractive sector, mine safety.173  Federal proxy 
rules also mandate certain disclosures regarding risk management, 
executive compensation, and board diversity that may also relate to 
ESG factors and risks.174 
However, the SEC has not yet indicated a willingness to consider 
any significant reforms of federal disclosure rules to address non-
financial matters. 175   Both the Securities Act of 1933 and the 
Exchange Act of 1934 authorize the SEC to require disclosure when 
“necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection 
of investors.”176  However, these statements of the SEC’s statutory 
 
 171 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, §§ 1502–1504, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213–22 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m 
(2012)) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Consumer Protection Act]; 17 C.F.R. § 229.104 
(2012) (prescribing mine safety disclosure); see also Conflict Minerals, supra note 132.  
In January 2017, the SEC announced its intention to re-evaluate Section 1502.  See 
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ACTING CHAIRMAN MICHAEL S. PIWOWAR, PUB. STATEMENT, 
RECONSIDERATION OF CONFLICT MINERALS RULE IMPLEMENTATION (Jan. 31, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/reconsideration-of-conflict-minerals-
rule-implementation.html [https://perma.cc/49B6-TCD5]. 
 172 See Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 
112–158, § 219, 126 Stat. 1214, 1235–36 (ITRA).  For a detailed examination of ITRA 
and a comparison to conflict minerals disclosure regulation, see Park, Targeted Social 
Transparency, supra note 20, at 108–13. 
 173  See Dodd-Frank Consumer Protection Act, supra note 171; 17 C.F.R. § 
229.104 (mine safety); see also Mine Safety Disclosure, 76 Fed. Reg. 81,762 (2011).  
The SEC’s final rule, Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-78167 (Sept. 26, 2016), was repealed Feb. 14, 2017 by 
H.J. Res. 41, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 174  See Harper Ho, Nonfinancial Risk Disclosure, supra note 13, at 426–28 
(summarizing these rules). 
 175  In August 2019, the SEC took an initial step toward expanding 
employment-related (i.e., “social”) disclosures by proposing to add “human 
capital” disclosures under Item 101 of Regulation S–K, which would be subject to 
companies’ own materiality judgment.  Modernization of Regulation S–K Items 
101, 103, & 105, 84 Fed. Reg. 44,358, 44,369–72 (Aug. 23, 2019) (codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pts. 229, 239, & 240). 
 176  Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77g(a)(1) (2018); see also id. § 77s(a); 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(b), 78l, 78m(a), 78n(a), 78o(d), 
78w(a) (2018).  Accordingly, leading securities law experts have argued that the 
SEC’s authority extends to rulemaking in the public interest and that “publicness” 
is a defining feature of securities law.  See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. 
Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 
GEO. L.J. 337, 375–82 (2013) (discussing how federal securities law is grounded in 
understandings of the “publicness” of listed companies); Hillary A. Sale, Public 
Governance, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1012, 1017–31 (2013) (same). 
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mission also link these two elements, requiring that in adopting any 
disclosure reform to advance the public interest, the SEC must also 
consider investor protection and “whether the action will promote 
efficiency, competition[,] and capital formation.” 177   Under this 
interpretation, the goals of disclosure under the federal securities 
laws are not necessarily aligned with the clear regulatory goals of 
disclosure under most sustainability reporting frameworks and 
other private regulatory regimes. 
By declining to adopt new rulemaking or guidance on non-
financial reporting, the SEC has deferred to private reporting 
standards and other forms of private ordering, which are central to 
U.S. non-financial reporting practice, as well as to corporate 
management’s judgment of ESG materiality.  As noted in Section 1, 
voluntary sustainability reporting is common among the largest U.S. 
public companies, and these reports are often based on frameworks 
and standards developed by the GRI, the CDP, or the SASB. 178  
Under these frameworks, third-party assurance, which is another 
form of private ordering, is optional. 
Similarly, the SEC has chosen to defer to ESG-related 
shareholder proposals and other forms of direct engagement 
between investors and companies to drive changes in corporate 
disclosure practice.  In 2019, consistent with past trends, 
environmental and social proposals accounted for around half of all 
voted proposals. 179   Some of these proposals generate ESG 
disclosure by asking the company to produce a report or provide 
specific ESG information.180  However, shareholder proposals are 
 
 177 Regulation S–K Concept Release, supra note 85, at 23,917 n.6, 23,921–22 
(citing Section 3(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2018), 
and Section 2(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2018)). 
 178 IRRC, supra note 24, at 31–33. 
 179 ERNST & YOUNG, FIVE TAKEAWAYS FROM THE 2019 PROXY SEASON 7 (July 23, 
2019), https://assets.ey.com/content/dam/ey-sites/ey-
com/en_us/topics/cbm/ey-cbm-2019-proxy-season-preview.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SV63-ADMA] (noting that average support for voted proposals 
has risen to 28 percent on average, and that approximately 40 percent of all 
environmental and social proposals are withdrawn prior to voting, often reflecting 
a successful shareholder engagement); see also THE CONFERENCE BOARD, PROXY 
VOTING ANALYTICS (2015–2018) 14–15 (2018) [hereinafter CONFERENCE BOARD], 
https://law.rutgers.edu/sites/law/files/RR-1674-18-R.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EL9C-EZD3]. 
 180 Thirteen such proposals were filed in 2018.  CONFERENCE BOARD, supra note 
179, at 231. 
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non-binding, making shareholder engagement a poor tool for 
standardizing disclosure practices across all firms. 
Although the SEC has not yet introduced a comprehensive ESG 
disclosure framework, it has taken steps to facilitate non-financial 
reporting, and indirectly, the use of private reporting frameworks.  
The most obvious example is its 2010 guidance on the materiality of 
climate-change-related risks, which highlighted where current 
reporting rules should already elicit such information.181  The SEC 
also indirectly facilitates ESG-related shareholder proposals 
through its no-action review process; by interpreting the relevant 
rules in a way that permits proposals to go to a vote, the SEC has 
allowed shareholders to raise the profile of ESG issues and to 
encourage non-financial reporting.182  
Other federal agencies have also played a modest facilitating 
role by removing perceived barriers to the use of ESG information 
in investment analysis and shareholder engagement.  Most notably, 
the Department of Labor’s current guidance for certain pension 
funds clarifies that ESG factors may be financially material to fund 
beneficiaries and therefore can be properly incorporated in fund 
management. 183   While not expressly endorsing any particular 
private standard, individual SEC commissioners have also 
periodically endorsed non-financial reporting and ESG concepts 
generally, and in 2016, the SEC raised the profile of non-financial 
reporting by seeking public comment on the need for changes to 
 
 181 See SEC Climate Release, supra note 169. 
 182 With limited exceptions, these proposals generally do not garner majority 
support.  See CONFERENCE BOARD, supra note 179, at 14, 90 (listing the limited 
number of environmental and social issues that have gained majority support). 
 183 Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Fiduciary Standard Under ERISA in 
Considering Economically Targeted Investments, 80 Fed. Reg. 65,135, 65,135-136 
(Oct. 26, 2015); cf. Principles for Responsible Investment & MSCI Inc., Global Guide 
to Responsible Investment Regulation 14–15 (2016), 
https://www.msci.com/documents/1296102/0/PRI_MSCI_Global-Guide-to-
Responsible-Investment-Regulation.pdf/ac76bbbd-1e0a-416e-9e83-9416910a4a4b 
[https://perma.cc/ZK9Q-JTAG] (noting that the European Commission’s 
Occupational Retirement Provision Directive and the domestic laws of Sweden, 
Norway, and Germany mandate ESG integration into risk management processes 
or investment decisions).  But see EMP. BENEFITS SECURITY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF 
LABOR, FIELD ASSISTANCE BULLETIN NO. 2018-01 (Apr. 23, 2018) (cautioning plan 
fiduciaries to “not too readily treat ESG factors as economically relevant” to 
investing and to carefully consider the potential costs of engagement with portfolio 
firms on ESG matters). 
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Regulation S-K to better elicit non-financial information.184  It also 
sought input on the private standards that could usefully inform 
future disclosure rulemaking.185 
Stock exchanges in the United States have played a limited role 
in promoting ESG disclosure among listed firms, in contrast to the 
leading role of stock exchanges in other jurisdictions.  However, the 
Nasdaq OMX and the NYSE are both members of the Worldwide 
Federation of Exchanges and participate in the United Nations 
Sustainable Stock Exchanges Initiative (SSEI).  Through their 
membership, these stock exchanges visibly endorse the work of the 
SSEI and indicate their support for its missions to advance ESG 
disclosure for listed firms, even though no U.S. exchange has yet 
adopted ESG disclosure policies or guidance.186 
In sum, the dominant mode of public-private interaction in the 
United States is deference to private ordering.  Private ordering 
takes many forms beyond a strong reliance on voluntary corporate 
reporting within and beyond public filings.  These range from the 
creation of reporting standards and frameworks, to shareholder 
engagement and other forms of activism, to reliance on third party 
assurance providers and, to a lesser extent, to shareholder litigation 
to promote disclosure accuracy and reliability. 
3.2.2. South Africa 
South Africa represents a model of non-financial reporting that 
predominantly relies on private regulation but nonetheless contrasts 
with the U.S’s deference to various forms of private ordering.  ESG 
disclosure in South Africa revolves around the King Code on 
Corporate Governance, initially created in 1994.187  The King Code 
is now in its fourth iteration as “King IV,” which went into effect in 
 
 184 See Regulation S-K Concept Release, supra note 85. 
 185 Id. at 23,973. 
 186  Sustainable Stock Exchs. Initiative, LIST OF PARTNER EXCHANGES, 
https://www.sseinitiative.org/sse-partner-exchanges/list-of-partner-exchanges/ 
[https://perma.cc/QD2V-J9G4] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019). 
 187 Inst. of Dirs. Of Southern Africa, King Report on Corporate Governance for 
South Africa (1994).  See also ROBERT ECCLES & MICHAEL KRZUS, THE INTEGRATED 
REPORTING MOVEMENT: MEANING, MOMENTUM, MOTIVES, AND MATERIALITY 5–6 
(describing the origins and creation of the King Code). 
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2017.188   The King Code was created and has been revised by a 
committee convened by the Institute of Directors in Southern Africa 
(IoDSA), which is primarily composed of private and independent 
members.189  The IoDSA, a professional body of board directors, is 
the custodian of the King IV reports.190  From its outset, the King 
Code has been based on voluntary principles and leading practices, 
rather than rules.191  It is expressly intended to complement and 
augment statutorily created hard law as part of a hybrid system of 
corporate governance.192 
One of the foundations of the King Code is transparency,193 and 
compliance is achieved through its disclosure regime.194  King IV 
expressly addresses the use of disclosed information by 
stakeholders.195  Its disclosure regime is based on two organizing 
principles: integrated reporting and “apply-and-explain.” 
Under the IIRC’s International <IR> Framework, integrated 
reporting seeks to integrate ESG disclosure with financial 
 
 188 Inst. of Dirs. in Southern Africa, King IV: Report on Corporate Governance for 
South Africa, 2016 38 (Nov. 1, 2016) [hereinafter King IV Report], 
https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.iodsa.co.za/resource/collection/684B68A7-B768-
465C-8214-E3A007F15A5A/IoDSA_King_IV_Report_-_WebVersion.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4Z69-F79G] (“King IV is effective in respect of the financial 
years starting on or after 1 April 2017”). 
 189  See id. at 119–20 (describing the process and participants in the 
development process of King IV). 
 190  Inst. of Dirs. in Southern Africa, King IV: Questions and Answers,  
https://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.iodsa.co.za/resource/collection/16F4503D-
86F9-43D5-AEB4-
C067B06EB59C/Guide_to_questions_and_answers_on_King_IV.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CX4Z-U7C6] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019). 
 191  See Ruth Jebe, Sustainability Reporting and New Governance: South Africa 
Marks the Path to Improved Corporate Disclosure, 23 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 233, 
266 (2015). 
 192 King IV Report, supra note 188, at 35. 
 193  See id. at 22 (“encourage transparent and meaningful reporting to 
stakeholders”). 
 194  Michael van Rensburg & Ashlin Perumall, JSE Listings Requirements 
Amended to Align with King IV, BAKER MCKENZIE (June 19, 2017), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=e63c908b-31d2-4c81-b1ea-
138b942a474a [https://perma.cc/R89Y-VCLM]. 
 195 King IV Report, supra note 188, at 48 (providing that “[t]he governing body 
[of the organization] should ensure that reports issued by the organisation enable 
stakeholders to make informed assessments of the organisation’s performance, and 
its short, medium and long-term prospects”). 
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information.196  King III, the predecessor to the current King IV, 
established integrated reporting in South Africa and served as a 
foundation for the development of the International <IR> 
Framework.197  King IV expressly adopts the “triple context”198 and 
the “six capitals” model 199  as organizing concepts for ESG 
disclosure.  The organization’s governing body (e.g., a corporation’s 
board of directors) has the discretion to determine where King IV-
compliant disclosures are made, either in an integrated report or a 
“distinguishable, prominent and accessible part of another report,” 
such as a sustainability report or social and ethics committee 
report.200  Disclosures may be posted on the organization’s website, 
on other platforms, or through other media.201 
King IV is based on “apply-and-explain,” an evolution of King 
III’s modified version of comply-or-explain.202   Under King IV’s 
apply-and-explain model, an organization must implement the King 
Code and also explain how its 17 principles have been implemented 
and how such measures achieve the principles’ contemplated 
outcomes.203  South Africa is the first country to implement apply-
and-explain as an organizing principle for its non-financial 
reporting regime. 
 
 196  Adam Sulkowski & Sandra Waddock, Beyond Sustainability Reporting: 
Integrated Reporting is Practiced, Required and More Would be Better, 10 U. ST. THOMAS 
L.J. 1060, 1064 (2013); see also Integrated Reporting SA, FAQ: The Octopus Model, 
https://integratedreportingsa.org/faq-the-octopus-model/ 
[https://perma.cc/37NX-MSJ9] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019) (describing the 
integrated report as the “head of the octopus…connected to a multitude of arms, 
each of which is a detailed report/information source: for instance, the financial 
statements, sustainability report, governance report, social and ethics committee 
report, risk report, remuneration report, or other printed or online information”). 
 197 See ROBERT ECCLES & MICHAEL KRZUS, supra note 187, at 8–10 (describing 
King III and the Integrated Reporting Committee of South Africa’s Discussion 
Paper). 
 198 King IV Report, supra note 188, at 24 (referring to the “combined context of 
the economy, society, and environment in which the organisation operates”). 
 199  See King IV Report, supra note 188, at 24 (referring to “financial, 
manufactured, intellectual, human, social and relationship, and natural capitals”). 
 200 King IV Report, supra note 188, at 28, 48. 
 201 King IV Report, supra note 188, at 48. 
 202 King IV Report, supra note 188, at 37.  See also ROBERT ECCLES & MICHAEL 
KRZUS, supra note 187, at 8. 
 203 See King IV Report, supra note 188, at 37. 
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The soft legal authority of King IV is supplemented by the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE).  The JSE requires 
implementation of the King Code as a condition for listing.204  The 
JSE is the world’s 19th largest stock exchange by market 
capitalization and the largest in Africa.205   Referencing the King 
Code in the JSE listing requirements has the effect of making the 
King Code mandatory for all JSE-listed companies.206  The JSE, a 
privately-owned entity, operates as an SRO supervised by the South 
African Financial Services Board (FSB).207  The FSB, which regulates 
and supervises the non-bank part of the South African financial 
services industry, is subject to the general authority of the Ministry 
of Finance.208 
In sum, the dominant mode of public-private interaction in 
South Africa is support.  Indirect facilitation of private ordering is 
evident in two inter-related domains, the creation of the King Code 
by IoDSA and its enforcement by the JSE.  Delegation is also evident 
insofar as the South African government enables the JSE to regulate 
non-financial reporting through its listing requirements absent an 
express regulatory mandate. 
 
 204 See JSE Limited Listings Requirements, para. 8.63(a) [hereinafter JSE Limited 
Listings Requirement], 
https://www.jse.co.za/content/JSERulesPoliciesandRegulationItems/JSE%20List
ings%20Requirements.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BAV-KWYW] (last visited Sept. 27, 
2019); see also ROBERT ECCLES & MICHAEL KRZUS, supra note 187, at 3 (noting the 
central role of the JSE and contrasting it to mandatory regulation by a securities 
regulator). 
 205  JSE Overview, Who We Are, https://www.jse.co.za/about/history-
company-overview [https://perma.cc/E9ES-TLNZ] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019). 
 206 Id.  See also JSE Limited Listings Requirements, supra note 204, at para. 3.84 
(“The effect of incorporating certain practices from the King Code in the Listings 
Requirements is to make their implementation mandatory, this is notwithstanding 
the fact that application of the corporate governance practices in the King Code is 
generally voluntary”). 
 207  INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, SOUTH AFRICA, IOSCO PRINCIPLES—
SECURITIES MARKETS: DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF IMPLEMENTATION 5 (Oct. 2010), 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr10355.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QP5J-5D5U]. 
 208 Id. 
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3.2.3. Brazil 
Non-financial reporting in Brazil is primarily governed by 
private ordering through B3, the country’s largest stock exchange.209  
As a stock exchange, B3 operates as an SRO on the basis of authority 
granted to it by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Brazil 
(Comissão de Valores Mobiliários, or “CVM”).210   B3 is a publicly-
traded corporation owned by institutional investors and is itself 
listed on the New Market (Novo Mercado) segment of B3.211  B3’s own 
annual sustainability report is produced in accordance with the GRI 
Standards.212 
B3 established non-financial reporting on a voluntary “report-
or-explain” basis for listed companies in 2011.213  Listed companies 
were encouraged to disclose whether they published a stand-alone 
 
 209 B3 is the successor to the BM&FBOVESPA and previously, the Sao Paolo 
Stock Exchange.  Gilson, Hansmann, & Pargendler, supra note 122, at 485.  In its 
current form, B3 was established in 2017 with the merger of BM&FBOVESPA and 
CETIP.  The following discussion refers to B3 in relation to the BM&FBOVESPA 
prior to 2017.  See B3, GUIDE FOR NONRESIDENT INVESTORS 3 [hereinafter B3 Guide], 
https://www.b3.com.br/data/files/F9/56/04/8D/932106108326F006790D8AA8
/GUIA-INR-B3.pdf [https://perma.cc/QS9W-LR46] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019). 
 210  The Brazilian securities markets are primarily regulated by the CVM, 
which in turn is supervised by the National Monetary Council.  B3 Guide, supra 
note 209, at 11.  See also Securities Act, Law No. 6.385/76 (Br.) (Dec. 7, 1976), 
https://www.cvm.gov.br/export/sites/cvm/subportal_ingles/menu/investors/
anexos/Law-6.385-ing.pdf [https://perma.cc/7K96-9A8G].  B3 is subject to direct 
oversight by the CVM. Sustainable Stock Exchanges Initiative, B3, 
https://sseinitiative.org/data/b3/ [https://perma.cc/RZ25-8ZMX] (last visited 
Sept. 27, 2019). 
 211  Sustainable Stock Exchanges Initiative, B3, 
https://sseinitiative.org/data/b3/ [https://perma.cc/RZ25-8ZMX] (last visited 
Sept. 27, 2019); see also B3, Ownership Structure, 
https://ir.bmfbovespa.com.br/static/enu/estrutura-acionaria.asp?idioma=enu 
[https://perma.cc/Z9SJ-5WU9] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019). 
 212  B3, NEW VALUE—CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY 12 (2016), 
https://www.b3.com.br/data/files/96/D0/37/3C/0F07751035EA4575790D8AA
8/GuiaNovoValor_SustentabilidadeNasEmpresas_EN.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/TLN9-GQ68]. 
 213 See BM&FBOVESPA, External Communication, Proposal to adopt “Report 
or Explain” sustainability reporting model for listed companies (Dec. 11, 2011) 
[hereinafter BM&FBOVESPA 2011 External Communication], 
http://www.b3.com.br/data/files/9F/12/E6/65/62121510FE0C840592D828A8/
EC-017-2011-Proposta-de-adocao-ao-modelo-Relate-ou-Explique-EN-US.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NL2F-T4VN]. 
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sustainability report or an integrated report, and indicate where the 
report was available, or alternatively, explain why they did not 
publish a report.214  From the beginning, B3’s disclosure regime was 
integrated into mandatory reporting requirements through the 
CVM’s Reference Form, which the CVM provides to issuers as a 
template for mandatory periodic reporting.215  The purpose of this 
integration was to reduce operational costs on companies associated 
with the report or explain disclosure regime.216  The CVM facilitated 
the establishment of this voluntary initiative by adding a new 
category to its reporting system for sustainability reporting.217 
Since 2017, B3’s ESG disclosure regime has focused on whether 
listed companies take into account the United Nations Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) in their sustainability reporting.218  This 
shift was prompted by the CVM’s decision to amend its Reference 
Form to expressly require disclosure on issuers’ ESG disclosure 
policies and practices. 219   The coordination between B3 and the 
CVM, and the integration of their respective reporting regimes, 
suggest that the CVM’s delegation of authority to B3, with respect 
to non-financial reporting, is a deliberate and coordinated policy 
decision to support non-financial reporting in Brazil. 
Public-private interaction is also evident in the coordination and 
assistance of private ESG disclosure regimes with B3.  B3’s 
 
 214  B3, Communication to Stakeholders, (Feb. 2018), at 12, 
https://www.b3.com.br/data/files/5A/D7/71/18/BE1E161010983D16790D8AA
8/Communication_to_Stakeholders_B3%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YWG-
SPRH]. 
 215 CVM, Instruction No. 480 (Dec. 7 2009), 
https://www.cvm.gov.br/export/sites/cvm/subportal_ingles/menu/investors/
anexos/CVMInstruction480.pdf [https://perma.cc/DAF4-JUS3].  This disclosure 
was made in the Reference Form under a residual category (Item. 7.8—Description 
of the company’s relevant long-term relationships not elsewhere described).  See 
BM&FBOVESPA 2011 External Communication, supra note 213; CVM, Instruction 
No. 480, supra note 215, art. 22 and annex 24. 
 216 See B3 Guide, supra note 209, at 12. 
 217 See BM&FBOVESPA 2011 External Communication, supra note 213. 
 218 B3, External Communication, Proposal for Listed Companies to “Report or 
Explain for the Sustainable Development Goals” (Apr. 12, 2017) [hereinafter B3 2017 
External Communication], 
http://www.b3.com.br/data/files/7C/D3/22/0B/200FC51097FB2DC5790D8AA
8/CE-013-2017-DP-Relate-Explique-ODS_ingles.pdf [https://perma.cc/EYX6-
SRHU]. 
 219 Id. 
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disclosure regime was developed in partnership with the GRI and 
the IIRC.220  Further, B3 has partnered with the GRI to offer training 
to listed companies on ESG disclosure practices.221  Along the same 
lines, B3 has partnered with the CVM, the GRI, and the Global 
Compact to develop guidance on SDGs-related disclosure in the 
Reference Form.222 
B3’s strategy with respect to non-financial reporting is consistent 
with its membership in UN-affiliated ESG fora such as the Global 
Compact, the PRI, and the SSEI.223  As much as their operational 
value, B3’s partnerships with the GRI and the IIRC serve as signals 
to foreign investors about Brazil’s commitment to ESG.224 
In sum, the dominant modes of public-private interaction in 
Brazil are support and partnership.  The establishment of Brazil’s 
stock exchange-based non-financial reporting framework was 
facilitated by legal and operational measures implemented by the 
CVM, which also constituted an implicit endorsement.  In addition, 
the inter-relationships between B3, the CVM, and global private ESG 
disclosure regimes (specifically the GRI and the IIRC) exhibit 
elements of partnership as shown by their collaboration on the 
establishment, implementation, and modification of B3’s disclosure 
regime. 
 
 220 BM&FBOVESPA 2011 External Communication, supra note 213. 
 221 See BM&FBOVESPA 2011 External Communication, supra note 213 (“To 
assist companies not familiar with sustainability reporting, the Exchange will hold 
training workshops in partnership with Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) in early 
2012.”); B3 2017 External Communication, supra note 218 (“As in the first version of 
‘Report or Explain,’ Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) will partner with us and will 
interact with companies (through training workshops, for example) to assist them 
in the process of understanding the SDGs and putting them into practice.”). 
 222 B3, B3, CVM, GRI and Global Compact Launch Document to Facilitate 
Disclosure of Socio-environmental Information (Dec. 7, 2018), 
http://www.b3.com.br/en_us/news/socio-environmental-information.htm 
[https://perma.cc/72WE-CKU5]. 
 223 See B3, NEW VALUE – CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 212, at 12. 
 224  See CFA INSTITUTE & PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT, ESG 
INTEGRATION IN THE AMERICAS: MARKETS, PRACTICES, AND DATA 26–27 (2018), 
https://www.cfainstitute.org/-/media/documents/survey/esg-integration-in-
the-americas.ashx [https://perma.cc/5VVX-WB5M] (noting that demand for ESG 
information and integration in Brazil is primarily from foreign investors). 
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3.2.4. European Union 
The European Union (EU) has adopted one of the most 
prominent mandatory non-financial reporting regimes in force 
today, but at the same time one that directly defers to private 
regulation and supports its further development.  At its core is the 
EU’s 2014 Non-Financial Reporting Directive (the “EU Directive”), 
which requires the disclosure of non-financial information by 
certain large firms defined as “public interest entities” (PIEs).225  Its 
explicit dual purpose is first, to harmonize non-financial reporting 
practice across the EU and second, to advance public policies in 
favor of corporate accountability, responsible business practice, and 
sustainable economic development.226 
In contrast to the U.S.’s shareholder-centric approach, the EU 
uses disclosure to improve corporate governance and change 
business practice in matters like diversity and human rights,227 and 
defines materiality in terms of both investors and other 
stakeholders.228  The EU Directive builds on priorities set by the EU 
in 2003 to encourage greater corporate accountability for 
environmental and social impacts by improving transparency, as 
well as the EU’s view that the role of business includes both 
 
 225 Council Directive 2014/95, of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 22 October 2014, 2014 O.J. (L 330), amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards 
disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings 
and groups [hereinafter EU Directive].  PIEs are entities that individually or as a 
corporate group on a consolidated basis have on average more than 500 employees 
during the fiscal year.  Id. at arts. 1(1) & 1(3).  The EU Directive permits Member 
States to expand the scope of companies who are subject to the EU Directive’s 
reporting requirements.  Id. at preamble par. 14, art. 1(d) (exempting small and 
medium-sized enterprises). 
 226  Id. at preamble paras. 3 & 6.  See also European Commission, 
Communication from the Commission: Guidelines on Non-Financial Reporting 
(2017/C 215/01), 5 July, 2017, at 5, 7, 13 [hereinafter NFR Guidelines] (stressing the 
need for disclosure to support sustainable finance and the national implementation 
of the Guiding Principles, the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals, and the Paris 
Climate Accord). 
 227 See EU Directive, supra note 225, at preamble, para. 18 (stating its purpose 
to “put indirect pressure on (companies) to have diversified boards”). 
 228 See EU Directive, supra note 225, at para. 4.  Such materiality assessments 
should include the external “impact of [corporate] activities” on third parties, not 
just material non-financial risks to the firm itself.  See also NFR Guidelines, supra 
note 226, at 5–6 (disclosure of materiality assessment processes is optional). 
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generating profits for shareholders and producing “shared value” 
for society.229 
The EU Directive offers an excellent example of the dynamic, 
iterative relationship between private and public regulation.  First, 
the EU Directive was itself influenced by a wide range of prior 
public-private initiatives—most notably, the IIRC’s work on an 
integrated approach to financial and non-financial reporting.230  In 
addition, the comply-or-explain approach to disclosure was 
pioneered in the United Kingdom, and Danish non-financial 
reporting rules also influenced the project.231  Further, the goals of 
the EU Directive are well-aligned with the regulatory goals of most 
private reporting regimes. 
The EU Directive requires that a PIE provide a non-financial 
statement in its management report that includes information on the 
entity’s environmental, social and employee-related matters, respect 
for human rights, anti-bribery matters, and diversity. 232   The 
statement must also include a description of the entity’s policies in 
each of these areas, the due diligence processes it has implemented 
to mitigate adverse corporate impacts, and a statement of the 
outcome of these policies.233  In addition, the non-financial statement 
should include a discussion of the principal risks linked to the 
 
 229  See EU Directive, supra note 225, at preamble para. 2 (citing European 
Commission, “A Renewed EU Strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social 
Responsibility,” adopted Oct. 25, 2011).  See EU Parliament CSR Report, supra note 
47, at paras. 2, 5, & 23 (noting that CSR must be embedded within companies’ 
business, financial, and operational strategies).  The concept of “shared value” as a 
goal for both for-profit and nonprofit entities was first introduced by management 
scholars Michael Porter and Mark Kramer.  See generally Michael E. Porter & Mark 
R. Kramer, Creating Shared Value, 89 HARV. BUS. REV. 62 (2011). 
 230  See NFR Guidelines, supra note 226, at 3–4 (noting the Commission’s 
review of these standards).  See also EU Parliament CSR Report, supra note 47 
(discussing the need to promote the IIRC framework). 
 231 See Stefan Muller et al., Stakeholder Expectations on CSR Management and 
Current Regulatory Developments in Europe and Germany, 12 CORP. OWNERSHIP & 
CONTROL 505–06 (2015). 
 232 See EU Directive, supra note 225, at arts. 1(1), 1(3) (adding new arts. 19(a)(1) 
and 29(a)(1)). 
 233 See EU Directive, supra note 225, at arts. 19(a)(1)(b)–(c), 29(a)(1)(b)–(c). 
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company’s business activity, responses necessary to mitigate those 
risks, and relevant key performance indicators (KPIs).234 
EU member states were required to adopt implementing 
legislation at the national level by the end of 2016,235 and the EU 
Directive allows member states to exceed the minimum standards it 
establishes. 236   The particular legal authorities responsible for 
regulation and implementation also vary by jurisdiction.  In order to 
improve the comparability of reporting across firms and within 
sectors, the EU has issued non-binding reporting guidelines to 
promote greater uniformity across member states with respect to 
particular non-financial performance indicators.237 
Despite its mandatory nature, the EU Directive strongly 
supports and defers to existing private standards for non-financial 
reporting.  As the official guidance for the EU Directive itself 
observes, the EU Directive “gives companies significant flexibility to 
disclose relevant information in the way that they consider most 
useful.”238  In fact, the EU Directive may require no change in some 
companies’ non-financial reporting practice since it allows member 
states to exempt from any new reporting requirements those entities 
who already prepare a separate report on the basis of existing 
national, regional, or international frameworks that satisfy the EU 
Directive’s requirements.239  Part of its flexibility also comes from the 
principles-based nature of the EU Directive itself, which requires 
 
 234  See EU Directive, supra note 225, at arts. 19(a)(1)(d)–(e), 29(a)(1)(d)–(e).  
Entities should also disclose the principal risks of their “business relationships, 
products, or services” that are “likely to cause adverse impacts” where “relevant 
and proportionate.”  Id. at arts. 19(a)(1)(d), 29(a)(1)(d). 
 235 See EU Directive, supra note 225, at art. 4.  See generally GRI & CSR EUROPE, 
MEMBER STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF DIRECTIVE 2014/95/EU (2017), 
https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/NFRpublication%20online_ve
rsion.pdf [https://perma.cc/5R2L-S3U4] (discussing progress towards 
implementation). 
 236 See EU Directive, supra note 225, arts. 1(1)(6), 1(3)(6).  For example, member 
states can require companies to obtain third-party assurance of non-financial 
statements even though the EU Directive only requires an auditor to certify that the 
non-financial statement has been made.  See id. art. 19(a)(5). 
 237 See generally NFR Guidelines, supra note 226. 
 238 See NFR Guidelines, supra note 226, at 2. 
 239  See EU Directive, supra note 225, at preamble para. 9, arts. 1(1), 1(3) 
(adopting art. 19(a)(4)).  Entities relying on such frameworks must disclose on 
which frameworks they rely.  See id. arts. 1(1), 1(3). 
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only that the required disclosures are to be made on a comply-or-
explain basis. 
Finally, the EU Directive does not require third-party assurance, 
gives companies freedom to largely determine what to disclose, and 
allows member states to permit firms to publicize the non-financial 
statement on their website rather than with the entity’s management 
report.240  The trade-off for this flexibility is that the EU Directive 
cannot effectively promote standardization and comparability of 
non-financial information. 
The EU Directive and its guidance also offer clear examples of 
support for private ordering as they reference over twenty of the 
internationally recognized private reporting standards that were 
consulted during the drafting process, including the CDP Standards, 
the GRI, SASB, and ISO 26000. 241   The EU Directive explicitly 
endorses these national and international reporting frameworks, as 
well as a number of multilateral public-private standards, including 
the EMAS, the Global Compact, the Guiding Principles, and the 
OECD Guidelines. 242   The European Commission’s High Level 
Expert Group (HLEG) on Sustainable Finance has also specifically 
endorsed the work of the TCFD by urging the integration of the 
TCFD voluntary disclosure recommendations into EU policy.243 
Beyond the modes of public-private interaction highlighted 
above, the adoption of the EU Directive has also facilitated the 
emergence of new ESG disclosure initiatives and guidance from the 
private sector.  For example, in 2017, Nasdaq issued an ESG 
Reporting Guide for issuers in the Nordic and Baltic markets that 
provides specific ESG performance indicators and specifically 
references the EU Directive, the UN’s Sustainable Development 
 
 240  See EU Directive, supra note 225, at preamble para. 16, art. 1 (adopting art. 
19(a)(6)). 
 241  See NFR Guidelines, supra note 226, at 3–4 (noting the Commission’s 
review of these standards). 
 242 See, e.g., NFR Guidelines, supra note 226, at 11; EU Directive, supra note 225, 
at para. 11 (urging companies, governments and stakeholders to reference existing 
frameworks). 
 243 See NFR Guidelines, supra note 226, at 6–7, 13.  The TCFD framework itself 
also endorses many of the same voluntary private frameworks.  See generally TASK 
FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES, IMPLEMENTING THE 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES 
(2017), https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/FINAL-TCFD-
Annex-Amended-121517.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YX6-J32F]. 
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Goals, and the TCFD’s climate reporting framework.244  Stimulating 
new reporting initiatives by companies and private organizations in 
this way is an explicit goal of the EU Directive.245 
In sum, the dominant modes of public-private interaction in the 
European Union are deference and support.  Although 
implementation by particular member states varies, the 2014 Non-
Financial Reporting Directive largely defers to existing private 
standard setters and voluntary disclosure practices.  The EU has also 
endorsed and facilitated the development of private standards and 
reporting guidance. 
3.2.5. United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom (U.K.) is a global leader in the promotion 
of non-financial reporting and has over the past decade developed 
an increasingly mandatory approach.  These efforts are led by the 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC), a private organization that is 
responsible for audit and accounting oversight, and for establishing 
corporate governance and investor stewardship standards. 
ESG disclosure is required under the U.K.’s Corporate 
Governance Code,246 and under the listing rules of the U.K. Listing 
Authority.247  Even though the U.K. is generally seen as a strongly 
shareholder-centric jurisdiction, its non-financial reporting 
regulation builds on earlier corporate governance reforms that 
promoted greater corporate accountability for stakeholder impacts.  
This transition to what has been called an “enlightened shareholder 
value” model came in 2006, when Section 172 of the Companies Act 
redefined director fiduciary duties to shareholders to include 
 
 244  See NASDAQ, ESG REPORTING GUIDE: A SUPPORT PROGRAM FOR NASDAQ 
ISSUERS—FOCUS AREA: NORDIC & BALTIC MARKETS (2017), 
https://business.nasdaq.com/esg-guide/ [https://perma.cc/ELD4-M2X2]. 
 245 See NFR Guidelines, supra note 226, at 14. 
 246  See generally FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL (FRC), THE U.K. CORPORATE GOV. 
CODE (July 2018), https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/88bd8c45-50ea-4841-
95b0-d2f4f48069a2/2018-UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-FINAL.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/G9W4-6QA2]. 
 247 The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), the U.K.’s securities regulator, 
also regulates listing requirements in the U.K. through the U.K. Listing Authority, 
but each exchange may also adopt its own listing rules.  See also LONDON STOCK 
EXCHANGE GROUP, supra note 34. 
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consideration of corporate stakeholders and the long-term interests 
of the company.248 
Before the adoption of the 2006 Companies Act, ESG disclosure 
was largely voluntary and based on companies’ own reporting 
frameworks or those developed by third-party standard setters.  
Like the other jurisdictions surveyed in this Article, many of the 
U.K.’s current approaches to non-financial reporting also build on 
private and public-private ESG initiatives such as the Guiding 
Principles.249  Many U.K. companies not subject to ESG disclosure 
rules also produce voluntary sustainability reports or have begun to 
integrate ESG disclosure into their annual reports.250 
Since 2006, ESG disclosure in some form has been mandated for 
companies formed or listed in the U.K. under various overlapping 
regimes.  Listed or “quoted” companies are required under the 
Companies Act 2006 to report certain environmental issues in their 
directors’ reports. 251   Regulations introduced in 2013 under the 
Companies Act require further that quoted companies disclose 
greenhouse gas emissions and report on human rights issues, as well 
as director, management, and employee gender diversity in a 
strategic report on a comply-or-explain basis. 252   Although the 
 
 248  See generally ANDREW KEAY, THE ENLIGHTENED SHAREHOLDER VALUE 
PRINCIPLE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2013) (discussing the corporate 
governance reforms that led to the “enlightened shareholder value” model). 
 249 See generally U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra 
note 60. 
 250  See Environmental, Social and Governance (“ESG”): New UK Mandatory 
Reporting Rules, MAYER BROWN (Sept. 2013), 
https://www.mayerbrown.com/files/Publication/123b4ac7-a050-46f2-9449-
0b6740327749/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/57d4f570-4b22-4a0b-8376-
1e639889272e/UK_Mandatory_Reporting_Sep13.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BBP-
J8SP] (discussing the new 2013 SR Regulations). 
 251 See UKLA Technical Note: Risk Factors, FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY (July 
2013), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/other/tn-621.2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9LMP-SDAE] (discussing the Prospectus Directive (PD) and 
noting the risks associated with the prospectus summary requirement). 
 252  Under the Companies Act, narrative reporting must be provided in a 
Strategic Report and a Directors’ Report.  See The Companies Act 2006 (Strategic 
Report and Directors’ Report) Regulations 2013, No. 1970, Part 15, ch. 4A 
(concerning strategic reports) & Part 15, ch. 5 (concerning directors’ reports) (UK), 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/contents 
[https://perma.cc/Y4A3-C2AD].  See also EXPOSURE DRAFT: GUIDANCE ON THE 
STRATEGIC REPORT,  FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL (Aug. 2013), 
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Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) can enforce violations of the 
Corporate Governance Code, the adequacy of these disclosures is 
enforced primarily through private ordering via shareholder 
engagement rather than by administrative enforcement. 253  
Nonetheless, all of these reforms mean that the U.K. reflects a high 
degree of regulatory strength with respect to non-financial 
reporting. 
The U.K. was also among the first EU member states to 
implement the EU Directive,254 and the U.K.’s regulations are among 
the more stringent.  The U.K. regulations require both quoted 
companies and large companies to report their principal risks, 
business risks and non-financial KPIs in the company’s strategic 
report, in addition to a diversity statement.255  Going beyond the 
EU’s baseline, the U.K. requires these ESG disclosures to be audited 
for consistency and provides that directors may be fined for 
violations of these requirements. 256   Notwithstanding the 
mandatory force of these rules, the U.K. regulations also support 
and endorse the use of “national, EU-based and international 
reporting framework[s]” so long as the reporting company discloses 
 
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/e17e5074-7139-4453-a176-
3ca1fd229f51/;.aspx [https://perma.cc/2CMC-H7G9]; ENVIRONMENTAL REPORTING 
GUIDELINES: INCLUDING STREAMLINED ENERGY AND CARBON REPORTING GUIDANCE, 
DEFRA (June 2013), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads
/attachment_data/file/791529/Env-reporting-guidance_inc_SECR_31March.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4EWZ-25X7].  Listed companies’ annual reports include 
financial statements and the strategic report, directors’ report, corporate 
governance statement, and directors’ remuneration report.  See MARC MOORE & 
MARTIN PETRIN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: LAW, REGULATION, AND THEORY 199 
(2017) (discussing the U.K.’s disclosure framework). 
 253  See MOORE & PETRIN, supra note 252, at 62–64 (discussing enforcement 
mechanisms). 
 254  See The Companies Act 2006 (U.K.), 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/contents.  See generally 
discussion supra Section 3.2.4 (analyzing the EU Non-Financial Reporting 
Directive). 
 255  See Companies Act 2006, supra note 252, at art. 3 (amending the Companies 
Act 2006). 
 256  See GRI & CSR EUROPE, MEMBER STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF DIRECTIVE 
2014/95/EU (2017), at 30, 
https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/NFRpublication%20online_ve
rsion.pdf [https://perma.cc/KYF7-RC2S]. 
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which it has adopted.257  These revisions took effect in 2016 as a 
further amendment to the content of the strategic report under the 
Companies Act 2006. 
In sum, the dominant modes of public-private interaction in the 
United Kingdom are deference and support.  The comply-or-explain 
principles that ground its corporate governance regime also 
represent a hybrid public-private approach.  Similarly, the FRC’s 
role in developing standards for companies and investors represents 
a form of delegation.  The U.K.’s implementation of the EU Non-
Financial Reporting Directive, however, represents a more 
mandatory approach to disclosure, while still continuing to defer to 
private disclosure frameworks. 
3.2.6. Hong Kong 
Hong Kong is another jurisdiction that illustrates multiple 
modes of public-private interaction in the context of ESG disclosure.  
Like many of the other jurisdictions surveyed here, Hong Kong has 
transitioned to a mandatory non-financial reporting regime, but one 
whose content reflects strong deference and delegation to private 
regulation. 258   However, in contrast to the United States, Hong 
Kong’s non-financial reporting framework engages broadly with 
existing private standards for ESG disclosure.  Like the EU and the 
U.K., Hong Kong’s “mandatory” ESG standards are in fact a “soft 
mandate,” offering a high degree of flexibility while deferring to 
management judgment and voluntary disclosure standards.  Hong 
 
 257 See The Companies, Partnerships and Groups (Accounts and Non-financial 
Reporting) Regulations 2016, Companies Partnership 2016 No. 1245, 414CB(6) (UK), 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2016/1245/made/data.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8NDZ-6RDC]. 
 258 See HONG KONG STOCK EXCH., ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND GOVERNANCE 
(ESG) REPORTING GUIDE (Jan. 2016) para. 6 & 11(1) [hereinafter HKEX ESG GUIDE], 
https://en-rules.hkex.com.hk/node/3841 [https://perma.cc/5TAK-MH9R] 
(defining materiality in terms of stakeholders for environmental and social 
reporting purposes).  The HKEx ESG Guide is incorporated in App. 27 of the Main 
Board Listing Rules and App. 20 of the GEM listing rules.  See also HONG KONG 
STOCK EXCH., ESG REPORTING GUIDE AND FAQS (last updated on May 17, 2019), 
https://www.hkex.com.hk/Listing/Rules-and-Guidance/Other-
Resources/Listed-Issuers/Environmental-Social-and-Governance/ESG-
Reporting-Guide-and-FAQs?sc_lang=en [https://perma.cc/EJ3W-HEVY]. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
310 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 41:2 
   
 
Kong’s adoption of non-financial reporting rules for listed 
companies aligns with trends in global capital markets and supports 
its efforts to develop a reputation as a “green finance” hub.259 
The Hong Kong Stock Exchange’s (HKEx) core listing standards 
largely defer to issuers’ own judgments regarding ESG materiality.  
For example, issuers must provide a “discussion and analysis of the 
[company’s] performance and the material factors underlying its 
results and financial position,” a requirement that could include 
material ESG risks or impacts.260  The listing rules also encourage 
public companies to provide additional information voluntarily in 
their annual reports, such as “a discussion of the listed issuer’s 
policies and performance on community, social, ethical and 
reputational issues.”261  All companies incorporated in Hong Kong 
are also subject to certain non-financial reporting obligations under 
the Hong Kong Companies Act that are incorporated into the HKEx 
listing rules.262  These measures are enforced by the HKEx, with 
ultimate oversight by the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC). 
The HKEx non-financial reporting requirements, while 
mandatory, rest largely on private ordering.  In 2015, the HKEx 
amended voluntary ESG disclosure guidance it had adopted in 2011 
in order to make certain environmental and social disclosures 
mandatory for all listed companies on a comply-or-explain basis.263  
The HKEx’s ESG Guide requires companies to adopt specific 
environmental and social policies or to provide “considered 
 
 259 See HONG KONG SEC. & FUT. COMM’N, STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR GREEN 
FINANCE (Sept. 2018), https://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/green-finance.html 
[https://perma.cc/DU9E-QMED] (establishing environmental disclosure as a core 
element of its framework). 
 260 This discussion “should emphasize trends and identify significant events 
or transactions” during the reporting period.  See Main Board Listing Rules—App. 
16, A16–32, https://en-
rules.hkex.com.hk/sites/default/files/net_file_store/new_rulebooks/f/a/FAQs_
mb_appx16.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2VH-D56Q]. 
 261 Id. 
 262 See Hong Kong Companies’ Ordinance (2014), § 390(a)-(d) (stipulating the 
content of the Director’s Report); HKEx Main Board Listing Rules, App. 16–28 
(incorporating these requirements). 
 263 See HKEX ESG GUIDE, supra note 258, at para. 7 (superseding HONG KONG 
STOCK EXCH., CONSULTATION PAPER ON ESG REPORTING GUIDE (Dec. 2011).  
Specifically, these standards require all listed companies to include in either their 
annual report or in a free-standing ESG report a statement that they have complied 
with the ESG Guide for the fiscal year or an explanation of why they have not). 
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reasons” for any deviation.  It also includes additional KPIs that 
companies may elect to provide on a voluntary basis.264   
Although the HKEx’s ESG Guide does not explicitly reference or 
require listed companies to adopt any particular private ESG 
disclosure standard, it defers further to private reporting standards 
by allowing listed companies who already produce voluntary 
sustainability reports to continue to do so, so long as the private 
reporting standards are consistent with the HKEx’s standards and 
the company explains any deviations from the policies or indicators 
in the HKEx’s ESG Guide.  Indirectly setting minimum standards 
for these private regimes is in essence a form of meta-regulation.  
However, the HKEx also gives a high degree of deference to issuers 
regarding where and what to report, the particular entities covered 
by the report, how materiality is defined, and whether to obtain 
third-party assurance for reports.  
The HKEx also directly supports private international standards 
by endorsing them and facilitating their use.265  For example, the 
HKEx’s ESG Guide and related information for issuers directly 
reference the GRI’s ESG disclosure standards, as well as other 
international reporting standards, and encourage issuers to use 
them.266  The HKEx has also partnered with the GRI to prepare a 
“linkage guide” for listed companies to help them use the GRI 
Standards to comply with the HKEx’s ESG Guide.267  
In sum, the dominant modes of public-private interaction in 
Hong Kong are support coupled with a flexible comply-or-explain 
mandate.  Hong Kong offers an example of a gradual transition from 
voluntary ESG disclosure guidance to a soft mandate that 
 
 264  See SINGAPORE STOCK EXCHANGE (SGX-ST) LISTING RULE 711A & 
SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING GUIDE (July 20, 2016), 
http://rulebook.sgx.com/net_file_store/new_rulebooks/s/g/SGX_Mainboard_P
ractice_Note_7.6_July_20_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/YE6J-8L3W] (describing a 
similar stakeholder-oriented, principles-based comply-or-explain approach which 
was adopted by the Singapore Stock Exchange in 2016 after first introducing its 
rules as a voluntary reporting framework). 
 265  See HKEX, EXCHANGE PUBLISHES CONSULTATION PAPER ON PROPOSED 
CHANGES TO ITS ESG GUIDE (July 17, 2015), https://www.hkex.com.hk 
[https://perma.cc/9542-Y97J] (discussing the 2015 reforms). 
 266 See HKEX ESG GUIDE, supra note 258, at para. 7. 
 267 See GRI, LINKING THE GRI STANDARDS AND THE HKEX ESG REPORTING GUIDE, 
https://www.globalreporting.org/standards/resource-download-center/linking-
the-gri-standards-and-hkex-esg-reporting-guide/ [https://perma.cc/T7QA-
S3GE]. 
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encourages more prescriptive disclosures.  By setting minimum 
standards for private reporting frameworks, the Hong Kong stock 
exchange has also utilized meta-regulation to promote greater 
harmonization and consistency in reporting practice. 
3.2.7. China 
Given China’s centralized political system and the constraints it 
imposes on private enterprise and civil society, it is not surprising 
that China has developed a state-led approach to non-financial 
reporting.  What is surprising, however, is the degree to which the 
Chinese non-financial reporting landscape, like the other 
jurisdictions surveyed in this Article, relies heavily on private 
regulation and enforcement, and defers to corporate managers’ own 
judgments on the scope and form of disclosure.  
Institutionally, China’s approach to non-financial reporting is 
designed to advance broader public policy and regulatory goals, 
such as sustainable development, poverty alleviation, and reducing 
the harmful impacts of corporate activities. 268   Non-financial 
reporting is further supported by a range of central and sub-national 
government initiatives to promote CSR and sustainable 
development, as well as by peer pressure from industry leaders and 
foreign corporations that have embraced sustainability reporting.269  
Although most companies are not subject to non-financial 
reporting mandates, such requirements have been introduced to a 
growing number of China’s largest firms, including those listed on 
 
 268 See Shangshi Gongsi Zhili Zhunze (上市公司治理准则) [Code of Corporate 
Governance of Listed Companies] (promulgated by China Securities Regulatory 
Commission, Jan. 7, 2002; rev’d by China Securities Regulatory Commission, Sept. 
30, 2018) at §§ 1, 2, & ch. VII, respectively [hereinafter CSRC Code], 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/laws/rfdm/DepartmentRules/201904/P0
20190415336431477120.pdf [https://perma.cc/NT8T-YJMV] (noting that examples 
in corporate governance include protections for minority shareholders, 
independent director requirements, and, most recently, investor stewardship 
guidelines); see also Guiding Opinions, supra note 46 (establishing a policy 
framework for “greening” the financial system and anticipating the need for 
reliable information on the financial impacts of environmental risk). 
 269 See generally Virginia Harper Ho, Beyond Regulation: A Comparative Look at 
State-Centric Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law in China, 46 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 375 (2013) [hereinafter Harper Ho, Beyond Regulation] (discussing 
examples of these policies).  
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its stock exchanges, over the past decade.  China’s non-financial 
reporting rules and policies are administered primarily by the CSRC 
and mainland Chinese stock exchanges, which are under CSRC 
oversight.270  Since 2012, CSR reporting has been mandatory for the 
largest state-sector firms under policies adopted by the State-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC).271  
Environmental reporting is also required for companies listed on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and for companies in certain 
indices on either of China’s exchanges.272  Sustainability reporting 
has been encouraged by Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) guidance 
dating back to 2006.273  In 2018, the CSRC amended its corporate 
governance code for listed companies to require disclosure of 
environmental, poverty alleviation efforts and “other social 
responsibilities,” to the extent that “more specific regulations or 
departmental rules” clarify the precise content of such disclosures.274  
This code also encourages voluntary disclosure of “information that 
may impact the decisionmaking of shareholders and other 
stakeholders, besides disclosing information [required by] 
mandatory provisions.”275   China’s framework for establishing a 
 
 270 These measures are separate from those imposing disclosure obligations 
under the environmental laws, which are beyond the scope of this Article.  
 271  See SASAC, Notice of the Guiding Opinion Regarding the CSR 
Implementation of Centrally Managed Enterprises (关于印发《关于中央企业履行
社会责任的指导意见》的通知) [SASAC CSR Notice] (promulgated by SASAC, Dec. 
29, 2007, effective Jan. 4, 2008), arts. 1–8, 18–19 (noting that the guidelines were 
made mandatory for central SOEs in 2012).  See also Harper Ho, Beyond Regulation, 
supra note 269, at 409. 
 272  See Notice on Strengthening Listed Companies’ Assumption of Social 
Responsibility and on Issuing the Guidelines on Listed Companies’ Environmental 
Information Disclosure (关于加强公司社会责任承担工作暨发布《上海证券交易所
上市公司环境信息披露指引》的通知) (promulgated by Shanghai Stock Exchange, 
May 14, 2008), arts. 2–3 (encouraging disclosure of information regarding pollution 
levels and mitigation efforts and mandating disclosure for firms identified as 
“serious polluters” by the MEE). 
 273 See Shenzhen Stock Exchange Social Responsibility Instructions to Listed 
Companies (Sept. 25, 2006), at art. 9 & art. 36, 
http://www.szse.cn/English/rules/siteRule/t20070604_559475.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZPC4-ZM8M] (regarding basic disclosure and voluntary 
sustainability reporting); Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) Main Board Guidelines, 
at ch. 9, https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD630.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PN5Y-KV5B]. 
 274 See CSRC Code, supra note 268, at art. 95. 
 275 See id. at art. 91. 
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green financial system anticipates that all companies listed on 
China’s stock exchanges will be subject to mandatory environmental 
disclosures on a comply-or-explain basis by 2020, although at the 
time of this writing this has yet to be implemented. 276   Many 
mainland financial institutions and other large firms are also cross-
listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (so-called “red chip” 
stocks) and are therefore subject to the HKEx’s mandatory ESG 
disclosure requirements.277  
Although ESG disclosures under all of these regimes are 
increasingly prescriptive, their scope is limited.  As a result, China’s 
“mandatory” reporting regime, like those of the other jurisdictions 
surveyed here, defers in practice largely to private standard setters 
to develop reporting frameworks, and corporations have discretion 
on what disclosures to provide, which reporting frameworks to use, 
and how to report non-financial information.  
Government CSR policies, state-backed reporting standards, 
and government-backed awards encouraging sustainability 
reporting represent a form of partnership, as they all incorporate or 
draw heavily on private regulation in the form of internationally 
accepted reporting frameworks and best practices, as well as on 
international treaties and non-binding standards developed by the 
United Nations, the OECD, and other bodies. 278   Current non-
financial reporting guidelines do not specifically endorse 
international reporting standards, but the CSRC, the Ministry of 
Environment and Ecology (MEE), and other central government 
agencies look to frameworks such as the GRI Standards and the CDP 
as a point of reference.  Although the Chinese central government 
may at times favor local hybrid standards over private international 
standards, China does not require firms to follow state-sponsored 
 
 276 See IOSCO, SUSTAINABLE FINANCE IN EMERGING MARKETS AND THE ROLE OF 
SECURITIES REGULATORS (2019), 
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD630.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8V8S-Q526]. 
 277  See supra Section 3.2.6 (discussing of the Hong Kong ESG disclosure 
framework). 
 278 See Harper Ho, Beyond Regulation, supra note 269, at 404–05, 412. 
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CSR or ESG disclosure standards, and so does not in fact preempt or 
displace private ordering.279 
Beyond these kinds of hybrid public-private mandates, there are 
also other examples of public-private partnership in the Chinese 
reporting context.  For example, the main state-affiliated standard 
setter for non-financial reporting in China, the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences (CASS), and the GRI have taken steps to harmonize 
the CASS CSR reporting standards with the GRI Standards.280  
In sum, the dominant forms of public-private interaction in 
China are partnership and soft mandates.  Although China is a 
jurisdiction that exhibits a high degree of regulatory strength, its 
non-financial reporting policies and standards draw heavily on 
private models.  Moreover, like other jurisdictions, its disclosure 
mandates defer strongly to private ordering and apply only to 
certain large firms. 
4. OPTIMIZING PUBLIC-PRIVATE INTERACTIONS IN ESG DISCLOSURE 
The case studies in Section 3 illustrate different forms of 
interaction between public and private reporting regimes and show 
how governments have transitioned toward a more regulatory 
approach to ESG disclosure while accommodating and building on 
private ordering.  These examples further demonstrate the range of 
potential policy options for public-private interaction in non-
financial reporting outlined in Section 2, ranging from regulatory 
deference to private ordering on one end to mandatory disclosure 
rules on the other.  
From the diverse case studies presented in Section 3, several 
general observations can be made.  Each of these jurisdictions has 
implemented ESG disclosure through a different balance of public 
regulation and private ordering.  The case studies show that 
regulators rely heavily on private ordering even when transitioning 
 
 279  The Chinese central government’s backing of sub-national reporting 
standards as an alternative to international private standards could alternatively be 
viewed as a form of weak displacement. 
 280 See GRI, LINKING CASS CSR 3.0 AND GRI’S G4 SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING 
GUIDELINES, https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/Linking-CASS-
CSR-3.0-and-GRI%27s-G4-Sustainability%20Reporting-Guidelines.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GNC6-9XEM] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019). 
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to non-financial reporting mandates.  They also suggest that 
governments are hesitant to delegate rulemaking authority to 
specific private standard setters, and that evolving non-financial 
reporting rules reflect the view in many jurisdictions that the 
investor-oriented rationales of mandatory disclosure should align 
with underlying public policies that support sustainable 
development or address corporate impacts on stakeholders.  There 
is also considerable variation in the content of disclosure rules, as 
well as some convergence in the integration of ESG information in 
corporate annual reports about material financial risks.  Notably, 
none of the jurisdictions surveyed in Section 3 attempts to preempt 
private ordering.  
Our objective in this Article is not to advocate for a particular 
model of non-financial reporting or for specific ESG disclosure rules.  
Rather, in light of the market-based origins of ESG disclosure and 
the important benefits offered by both public regulation and private 
ordering, we argue that hybrid approaches to non-financial 
reporting are a more efficient path to developing harmonized 
reporting rules, even though our case studies show that this 
potential has yet to be realized in most jurisdictions.  Drawing on 
the observations and arguments in Section 2 and 3, the following 
discussion shows how optimal hybrid public-private disclosure 
models can work.  We propose that future reforms should continue 
to draw on or defer to evolving private standards and frameworks 
where flexibility and innovation are at a premium.  However, public 
regulators and mandatory reporting frameworks are necessary to 
promote the accessibility, reliability, and comparability of non-
financial information.  Here, we explore how regulators, such as the 
SEC, can leverage, harmonize, and legitimize private ordering to 
achieve these goals through the regulatory strategies presented in 
this Article.  
4.1. Leveraging Private Ordering 
As the cases in Section 3 show, governments seeking to foster 
more robust ESG disclosure have leveraged private reporting 
standards through support, partnership, delegation, and 
mandating.  These forms of public-private engagement can reduce 
regulatory costs while increasing regulatory effectiveness.  
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Leveraging enables governments to benefit from one of private 
regulation’s relative strengths:  its flexibility and responsiveness to 
the perceived needs of investors.281  Both investors and regulators 
face a heightened need to respond to rapidly changing market 
conditions and risks in global financial markets.282  Public regulators 
can tailor disclosure requirements to the needs of specific industries 
and respond to emerging risks more nimbly by drawing on private 
standards or by collaborating with firms, private standard-setting 
bodies, or industry associations.283  Governments are also uniquely 
positioned to ensure that disclosure rules align with broader public 
policy goals, ranging from market stability to ensuring that systemic 
non-financial risks, such as climate risk, are disclosed (and priced) 
in the market.  Depending on the jurisdiction, these policy goals may 
also include aligning financial regulation with sustainable 
development goals and related public policies.  
Leveraging can be undertaken at various stages in the public-
private collaborative relationship.  In all of the jurisdictions 
analyzed in Section 3, government regulators and/or stock 
exchanges have leveraged existing private standards, as well as 
international soft law standards, by consulting them in the creation 
of their non-financial reporting rules,284 and actively seeking to align 
their non-financial reporting rules with private ESG disclosure 
standards.285  The EU, the U.K., and Hong Kong have leveraged 
private standards most directly by permitting reporting companies 
to comply by using accepted private disclosure standards. 286  
Leveraging private standards already accepted by trade and 
industry associations can also free financial and securities regulators 
 
 281 See Vogel, supra note 108, at 264. 
 282 See Karmel & Kelly, supra note 142, at 890 (arguing that soft law has taken 
root “out of necessity  . . . [and] the speed, flexibility, and expertise that 
international securities regulation requires.”). 
 283 See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 118, at 526. 
 284 See supra Section 3 (describing commonly referenced standards including 
GRI Standards, the SASB sector-specific standards, the CDP climate-related 
disclosure framework and the OECD Guidelines). 
 285 See, e.g., supra Section 3.2.3 (discussing B3’s engagement with GRI and the 
IIRC); supra Section 3.2.6 (discussing the HKEx’s engagement with GRI). 
 286 See, e.g., supra Section 3.2.4 (discussing the EU Directive’s recognition of 
“national frameworks, [EU]-based frameworks . . . or other recognized 
international frameworks”). 
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to focus on helping firms connect this information to financial 
impacts for investors.287  
One concern with leveraging, however, is that it may call on 
public regulators to assess the relative value of private regimes and 
determine which ones to support, endorse, or even incorporate in 
regulation, which could inhibit private innovation in the 
formulation, implementation, and enforcement of private 
standards.  However, as the jurisdiction-specific case studies in 
Section 3.2 show, governments thus far have avoided endorsing any 
particular private framework and have instead endorsed private 
disclosure regimes via guidance, while deferring to companies’ own 
choices of reporting standard.  Other possibilities regulators can 
consider include waiting until clear market leaders emerge or 
designating certain standards as a regulatory safe harbor while 
allowing competing standards to evolve. 
As has been the case with financial reporting, monitoring and 
enforcing compliance with new non-financial reporting 
requirements will require the combined efforts of regulatory 
agencies, shareholders, advocacy organizations, and private 
intermediaries such as auditors and credit rating agencies.  Even 
greater cost savings may arise from leveraging private actors to 
engage in gatekeeping, oversight, and enforcement, which can help 
overcome regulators’ lack of resources to provide audit and 
assurance services or to identify and pursue violations of disclosure 
mandates.288  Just as financial reporting leverages the expertise of 
accountants and auditors, integrating ESG disclosure into corporate 
annual reports requires reliance on these same professionals and on 
other experts to assist companies with compliance, provide 
assurance services, and aid regulators in crafting sensible disclosure 
rules in areas such as environmental and social risk that may be 
beyond their traditional areas of expertise.289 
Of course, regulators may also incur costs associated with 
leveraging private standards.  These costs include oversight of 
 
 287 See EITI, supra note 57; ISO 26000 SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 58. 
 288 Freeman, Private Role, supra note 114, at 660. 
 289 See Walter Mattli & Tim Büthe, Global Private Governance: Lessons from a 
National Model of Setting Standards in Accounting, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 225, 
230–31 (2005) (noting the relatively higher costs incurred by governments in 
maintaining specialized regulatory expertise vis-à-vis private actors that can derive 
positive externalities from such expertise). 
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assurance providers and other third parties with which 
governments partner or to whom they delegate.290  Coordination 
between private standard setters and public regulators across 
multiple jurisdictions is necessary as well, and the global scope and 
distinct methodologies of existing private ESG disclosure 
frameworks may increase these oversight costs.291  However, soft 
law-based global governance regimes that engage regulators with 
private disclosure regimes, such as IOSCO’s recently-established 
sustainable finance network, offer promise as a means to facilitate 
this type of coordination.292 
4.2. Harmonizing Private Ordering 
As described in Section 1, the key weakness of private ordering 
that is driving regulators to introduce new ESG disclosure reforms 
is the fragmentation and lack of consistency of reporting content, 
format, timing, and scope.  These features have made ESG 
information reported outside of corporate annual reports costly to 
obtain, difficult to analyze, and almost impossible to compare with 
information disclosed in public filings.  Public-private engagement 
can help address this fundamental problem by facilitating the 
harmonization of private ESG disclosure regimes and their 
alignment with public disclosure rules, thereby reducing costs for 
investors and encouraging adoption by market participants.  
Nonetheless, harmonization requires government intervention since 
any coordination or integration of public and private regimes must 
be initiated by the appropriate legislative or regulatory bodies and 
should align with the materiality standards that already apply to 
financial reporting in the given jurisdiction. 
The regulatory strategies outlined in Section 2 and the models of 
public-private interaction adopted by the countries surveyed in 
Section 3 suggest some of the parameters of an optimal framework 
 
 290 McAllister, Third Party Verification, supra note 145, at 44. 
 291 See, e.g., TCFD FINAL REPORT, supra note 25, at 33 (noting concerns about the 
administrative burden of multiple disclosure frameworks and mandatory reporting 
requirements). 
 292 IOSCO, supra note 32, at 4 (noting IOSCO’s establishment of a Sustainable 
Finance Network of securities regulators). 
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for non-financial reporting within corporate annual reports and 
other public filings.  Most obviously, regulators can standardize 
reporting through more prescriptive rules, such as the U.K.’s 
greenhouse gas emissions disclosure rules, South Africa’s apply-or-
explain principles, or the specific disclosures required by China’s 
CSRC and by the stock exchanges in mainland China and Hong 
Kong.  Less directly, regulators can facilitate harmonization through 
meta-regulation—that is, by requiring that private reporting 
standards satisfy certain criteria with regard to format, reporting 
period, or the use of particular indicators.  By aligning ESG 
disclosure with existing financial reporting, these efforts also 
improve comparability.  Both the EU Directive and the HKEx’s 
listing standards essentially do this by allowing issuers to rely on 
separate sustainability reporting that nonetheless meets the 
minimum standards for non-financial reports.  In addition, 
partnership with third-party intermediaries that collect, organize, 
process, and disseminate information can promote harmonization 
by enabling communication with regulators regarding companies’ 
ability to process, analyze, and otherwise use non-financial 
information mandated by regulators. 
Greater harmonization can also be balanced with flexibility.  For 
example, the EU Directive and most of the jurisdictions surveyed in 
Section 3 use principles-based disclosure and a comply-or-explain 
approach to promote flexibility.  At the same time, they encourage 
or support more prescriptive disclosures.  In all of these 
jurisdictions, regulators have implemented non-financial reporting 
reforms only with respect to listed firms or a defined set of “large” 
firms for whom the reporting requirements may be relatively less 
novel or burdensome and whose experience might set the standard 
for smaller companies to follow.  While greater deference to private 
standards within new mandatory regimes may slow the pace of 
harmonization, this flexibility leaves space for market oversight and 
private ordering to continue to drive best practices. 
4.3. Legitimizing Private Ordering 
Beyond the benefits of harmonization, the interaction of public 
regulation and private ordering in non-financial reporting reform 
bolsters the legitimacy of existing private disclosure standards.  As 
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a specific genus of private governance, these private ESG disclosure 
regimes are vulnerable to critiques about their legitimacy.293  First, 
private reporting frameworks and other private governance regimes 
often lack the transparency and public participation that is part of 
the legislative or administrative rulemaking processes.294  This form 
of legitimacy, known as input legitimacy, focuses on the 
participatory qualities of rulemaking.  In domestic legal systems, the 
legitimacy of public regulation is derived from its authorization by 
a democratically elected legislature. 295   Administrative law is 
devoted to creating procedures to hold unelected regulators to 
account through procedural safeguards. 296   In contrast, private 
governance regimes do not enjoy such democratic legitimacy. 297  
Instead, private reporting standards derive their legitimacy from the 
market, as evidenced by their market share relative to competing 
standards. 
A second form of legitimacy, output legitimacy, focuses on the 
substantive outcomes of rulemaking,298 which may be undercut by 
weak monitoring and enforcement power.  This allows 
“decoupling” or greenwashing—i.e., the superficial ceremonial 
adoption of compliant policies that are at odds with inconsistent 
corporate practices. 299   Specifically, voluntary sustainability 
reporting enables decoupling if firms are permitted to disclose 
favorable information and hide unfavorable information, fail to 
adequately contextualize their disclosures, or provide false or 
 
 293 See Park, Investors as Regulators, supra note 29, at 30–38 (noting legitimacy 
deficits in privately-governed sustainable finance markets). 
 294 Freeman, Private Role, supra note 114, at 647. 
 295 See BRUMMER, supra note 164, at 183. 
 296 See Mendelson, supra note 150, at 771–72. 
 297 See Peer Zumbansen, The Constitutional Itch: Transnational Private Regulatory 
Governance and the Woes of Legitimacy, in NEGOTIATING STATE AND NON-STATE LAW: 
THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBAL AND LOCAL LEGAL PLURALISM 83, 96 (Michael A. Helfand, 
ed., 2015). 
 298 See BRUMMER, supra note 164, at 179. 
 299 Ariel Meyerstein, Transnational Private Financial Regulation and Sustainable 
Development: An Empirical Assessment of the Implementation of the Equator Principles, 
45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 487, 542–43 (2013).  See also Patricia Bromley & Walter 
W. Powell, From Smoke and Mirrors to Walking the Talk: Decoupling in the 
Contemporary World, 6 ACAD. MGMT. ANN. 483, 490–97 (2012) (identifying 
decoupling arising from unimplemented or routinely violated rules as one of two 
types of decoupling). 
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deliberately misleading disclosures.300  ESG disclosure in any form 
can become ritualistic and cosmetic if the reporting process is 
detached from the information flows that drive corporate 
decisionmaking.301  It may also provide false comfort to corporate 
management about the company’s environmental and social 
policies, thereby obscuring the need to address how well these 
corporate policies and practices are working.302 
Public-private engagement can therefore bolster both the input 
and output legitimacy of non-state ESG disclosure standards and 
frameworks.  Through endorsement, partnership, and mandating 
through incorporation into regulation, governments can publicly 
recognize specific standards and standard-setters as the EU has 
done in its reporting guidance; these measures give private 
standards input legitimacy in the eyes of investors and 
stakeholders.303  By partnering with private actors and incorporating 
private standards into disclosure rules, governments can also 
promote their legitimacy by subjecting private ESG standards to 
administrative process, legislative oversight, and public 
accountability.304  Regulators can also enhance input legitimacy by 
endorsing or facilitating private ESG regimes that engage 
shareholders and other stakeholders in the creation of reporting 
standards. 305   Finally, requiring companies to file sustainability 
reports with the public regulator, as is required by government 
 
 300 David Hess, The Three Pillars of Corporate Social Reporting as New Governance 
Regulation: Disclosure, Dialogue, and Development, 18 BUS. ETHICS Q. 447, 462 (2008).  
See also IRRC, supra note 24, at 27–37 (noting that current voluntary reporting 
practice is subject to all of these limitations). 
 301 Hess, supra note 300, at 465. 
 302 Chiu, supra note 13, at 382–86. 
 303  See Gulbrandsen, supra note 127, at 86 (referring generally to the 
legitimating function of incorporation). 
 304 See Mendelson, supra note 150, at 767–90 (explaining the importance of 
these processes). 
 305  See Park, Investors as Regulators, supra note 29, at 45–46 (proposing 
regulatory incentives for stakeholder participation in private governance-based 
sustainable finance regimes).  As noted above, many ESG disclosure frameworks, 
such as the GRI Standards, define materiality in terms of corporate impact on 
stakeholders and encourage companies to engage with stakeholders to determine 
what information they deem significant enough to disclose.  See, e.g. GRI, supra note 
81, 102–46 & 102–47, at 34–35 (regarding identification of reporting scope and 
material topics).  Stakeholder engagement is essential if the regulatory framework 
defines materiality in terms of stakeholder impacts. 
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regulators in Brazil and the U.K. and by the stock exchanges in Hong 
Kong and mainland China, enhances the output legitimacy of 
private ESG standards by lowering the cost of accessing this 
information, both for investors and stakeholders. 
5. CONCLUSION 
By distilling the theoretical literature on public-private hybridity 
and drawing on the experience of leading jurisdictions worldwide, 
this Article shows how regulators and policymakers can work with 
private actors to develop and implement reporting frameworks to 
meet investor demand for non-financial information.  Since they 
build on existing disclosure practices, these approaches can also 
generate cost-savings and other efficiencies for regulators, investors, 
and firms, and enable the dissemination of ESG information more 
effectively than either public regulation or private ordering alone. 
Far from undermining private ordering, governments’ multi-
faceted role in non-financial reporting reform can give it force.  At 
the same time, the case studies presented in this Article indicate that 
the benefits of greater deference to private ordering must be 
weighed against the need for harmonization and legitimacy that 
governments are well-positioned to address.  Fortunately, as the 
United States and other governments consider the need for new 
approaches to ESG disclosure, they can draw useful lessons from the 
experience of those countries that have already taken these crucial 
first steps. 
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Appendix I. Institutional Features of Selected Jurisdictions306 
 
U.S. South Africa Brazil EU U.K. Hong Kong 
China 
(PRC) 
Region 
N. 
America 
Africa S. America Europe Europe Asia Asia 
Developmental Stage 
Mature Developing Developing Mature Mature Mature Mature 
Legal Tradition307 
Common 
law 
Mixed civil, 
common & 
indigenous 
law; 
Common-
wealth 
Civil law Civil law Common law; 
Common-
wealth 
Common 
law; 
Common-
wealth 
Civil law, 
socialist 
and 
common 
law 
elements 
Corporate Governance 
Board-
centric; 
share-
holder-
oriented 
Board-
centric; 
stakeholder
-oriented 
Board-
centric; 
stakeholder
-oriented 
Board-
centric; 
stake-
holder-
oriented 
Share-holder-
centric; 
“enlightened 
shareholder 
value” 
Share-
holder-
centric; 
share-
holder-
oriented 
 
State-
centric & 
board-
centric; 
stakeholder
-oriented 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 306 Source: Authors’ compilation (various). 
 307 These categories reflect the dominant foundation of the legal system, but 
we acknowledge that lines between these traditions have blurred with the rise of 
the regulatory state in many of these systems, and with the advent of globalization.  
See Mary Ann Glendon, Sources of Law in a Changing Legal Order, 17 CREIGHTON L. 
REV. 663, 665–84 (1987) (discussing the convergence of common and civil law 
systems). 
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Appendix I (cont.). Institutional Features of Selected 
Jurisdictions 
 
U.S. South Africa Brazil EU U.K. Hong Kong 
China 
(PRC) 
Source of ESG Disclosure Regulation 
Regulator 
(SEC) & 
stock 
exchanges 
Financial 
Reporting 
Standard 
Council 
(FRSC) & 
stock 
exchange 
(JSE) 
Regulator 
(CVM) & 
stock 
exchange 
(B3) 
Member 
state 
financial 
regulators 
& stock 
exchanges 
Regulators 
(FRC, FCA) & 
stock 
exchanges 
Regulator 
(SFC) & 
stock 
exchange 
(HKEx) 
Regulator 
(CSRC) & 
stock 
exchanges 
(SHSE, 
SZSE) 
Basis for ESG Disclosure in Annual Reports 
Prescrip-
tive and 
principles
/ 
material-
ity-based, 
and 
necessary 
to render 
disclosure 
not mis-
leading 
Integrated 
reporting 
(apply or 
explain) 
Principles-
based 
Principles-
based 
Principles-/ 
materiality-
based, and 
necessary to 
understanding 
of the business 
Principles-/ 
materiality-
based 
Principles-/ 
materiality-
based 
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Appendix II. ESG Disclosure Measures in Selected 
Jurisdictions308 
 
Measure Institution 
Mandatory 
Voluntary  
Comply or 
Explain 
ESG Scope Covered Entities 
Disclosure 
Placement Assurance 
U.S. 
Dominant Mode of Interaction: Deference 
Regulation S-
K 
Securities 
regulator 
(SEC) 
Mixed Multi-
dimen-
sional 
Public Annual 
report 
Optional 
2010 Climate 
Guidance 
Securities 
regulator 
(SEC) 
Mixed Multi-
dimen-
sional 
Public Annual 
report 
Optional 
South Africa 
Dominant Modes of Interaction: Support/ Delegation 
King IV Institute of 
Directors in 
S. Africa 
(private) 
C or E Multi-
dimen-
sional 
All (opt.) Integrated 
report 
Optional 
JSE Listing 
Standards 
Stock 
exchange 
C or E (King 
Code) 
Multi-
dimen-
sional 
Listed Integrated 
report 
Optional 
Brazil 
Dominant Modes of Interaction: Support/ Delegation/ Partnership 
CVM Rules 
358 & 489 
Securities 
regulator 
Annual 
report (M); 
sustain-
ability report 
(V) 
Multi-
dimen-
sional 
Listed Annual 
report (M) 
Optional 
B3 Stock 
exchange 
Voluntary Non-
financial 
factors 
Listed Annual 
report (V) 
Optional 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 308  The jurisdictions are organized by mode of interaction in order of 
regulatory strength—i.e., from market-based/deferential to most state-dominated.  
Sources are as referenced in footnotes, supra Section 3.2. 
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Appendix II (cont.). ESG Disclosure Measures in Selected 
Jurisdictions 
 
Measure Institution 
Mandatory 
Voluntary  
Comply or 
Explain 
ESG Scope Covered Entities 
Disclosure 
Placement Assurance 
EU 
Dominant Modes of Interaction: Deference/ Support/ Delegation 
2014 Non-
finan. 
Disclosure 
Directive 
Varies by 
Member 
State 
C or E Multi-
dimen-
sional 
Large firms 
(“public 
interest 
entities”) 
Annual 
report; 
sustain-
ability 
report (V) 
Optional 
U.K. 
Dominant Modes of Interaction: Deference/ Support/ Mandate 
Companies 
Act 2006, 
Regulations 
(2013), Part 
XV & XVI 
Business 
regulator 
(U.K. Dept. 
for Bus., 
Innov. & 
Skills) 
C or E Envt’l,   
human 
rights, 
diversity 
Large 
firms; add’l 
for listed 
Annual 
report 
Audit 
required 
U.K. 
Corporate 
Governance 
Code 2018 
Financial 
Reporting 
Council 
(private) 
Mandatory Risk 
mgmt. 
Listed Annual 
report 
Audit 
required 
London Stock 
Exchange ESG 
Listing Guide 
FCA (U.K. 
Listing 
Authority) 
Voluntary Multi-
dimen-
sional 
Listed Annual 
report, 
sustain-
ability 
report, or 
integrated 
report 
Optional 
Hong Kong 
Dominant Modes of Interaction: Support/ Mandate 
Corporate 
Governance 
Code (2014) 
Stock 
exchange 
(HKEx) 
C or E; 
mandatory 
Risk 
mgmt. 
 Summary 
financial 
reports; 
annual 
reports 
Audited 
financials 
HKEx Listing 
Rules App. 16 
(ESG 
Disclosure) 
Stock 
exchange 
(HKEx) 
C or E Envt’l/  
Social 
Listed ESG t or 
sustain-
ability 
report 
Optional 
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Appendix II (cont.). ESG Disclosure Measures in Selected 
Jurisdictions 
 
Measure Institution 
Mandatory 
Voluntary  
Comply or 
Explain 
ESG Scope Covered Entities 
Disclosure 
Placement Assurance 
China (PRC) 
Dominant Modes of Interaction: Partnership/ Mandate 
Corporate 
Governance 
Code 
Securities 
regulator 
(CSRC) 
Voluntary Multi-
dimen-
sional 
Listed N/A N/A 
Shanghai 
Stock 
Exchange 
Listing Rules 
Stock 
exchange 
Envt’l report 
(M); Sustain-
ability report 
(V) 
Multi-
dimen-
sional 
Certain 
SOEs; 
listed 
Envt’l 
report 
Optional 
Shenzhen 
Stock 
Exchange CSR 
Guidance 
Stock 
exchange 
Sustain-
ability report 
(V) 
Multi-
dimen-
sional 
Listed Sustain-
ability 
report 
Optional 
SASAC 2008 
CSR 
Guidelines 
SOE 
regulator 
Sustain-
ability report 
(V) 
Multi-
dimen-
sional 
Central 
SOEs 
Sustain-
ability 
report 
Optional 
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